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"We are at the very beginning of
time for the human race. It is not
unreasonable that we grapple with
problems. But there are tens of
thousands of years in the future.
Our responsibility is to do what we
can, learn what we can, improve
the solutions, and pass them on."
Richard Feynman (1918-1988)
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Abstract
The number of smart and connected mobile devices is increasing, bringing enor-
mous possibilities to users in various domains and transforming everything that
we get in touch with into smart. Thus, we have smart watches, smart phones,
smart homes, and finally even smart cities. Increased smartness of mobile de-
vices means that they contain more valuable information about their users, more
decision making capabilities, and more control over sometimes even life-critical
systems. Although, on one side, all of these are necessary in order to enable
mobile devices maintain their main purpose to help and support people, on the
other, it opens new vulnerabilities. Namely, with increased number and volume
of smart devices, also the interest of attackers to abuse them is rising, making
their security one of the main challenges. The main mean that the attackers use
in order to abuse mobile devices is malicious software, shortly called malware.
One way to protect against malware is by using static analysis, that investi-
gates the nature of software by analyzing its static features. However, this tech-
nique detects well only known malware and it is prone to obfuscation, which
means that it is relatively easy to create a new malicious sample that would be
able to pass the radar. Thus, alone, is not powerful enough to protect the users
against increasing malicious attacks. The other way to cope with malware is
through dynamic analysis, where the nature of the software is decided based on
its behavior during its execution on a device. This is a promising solution, be-
cause while the code of the software can be easily changed to appear as new, the
same cannot be done with ease with its behavior when being executed. How-
ever, in order to achieve high accuracy dynamic analysis usually requires compu-
tational resources that are beyond suitable for battery-operated mobile devices.
This is further complicated if, in addition to detecting the presence of malware,
we also want to understand which type of malware it is, in order to trigger suit-
able countermeasures. Finally, the decisions on potential infections have to hap-
pen early enough, to guarantee minimal exposure to the attacks. Fulfilling these
requirements in a mobile, battery-operated environments is a challenging task,
for which, to the best of our knowledge, a suitable solution is not yet proposed.
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In this thesis, we pave the way towards such a solution by proposing a dy-
namic malware detection system that is able to early detect malware that appears
at runtime and that provides useful information to discriminate between diverse
types of malware while taking into account limited resources of mobile devices.
On a mobile device we monitor a set of the representative features for presence
of malware and based on them we trigger an alarm if software infection is ob-
served. When this happens, we analyze a set of previously stored information
relevant for malware classification, in order to understand what type of mal-
ware is being executed. In order to make the detection efficient and suitable for
resource-constrained environments of mobile devices, we minimize the set of ob-
served system parameters to only the most informative ones for both detection
and classification. Additionally, since sampling period of monitoring infrastruc-
ture is directly connected to the power consumption, we take it into account as
an important parameter of the development of the detection system. In order
to make detection effective, we use dynamic features related to memory, CPU,
system calls and network as they reflect well the behavior of a system.
Our experiments show that the monitoring with a sampling period of eight
seconds gives a good trade-off between detection accuracy, detection time and
consumed power. Using it and by monitoring a set of only seven dynamic fea-
tures (six related to the behavior of memory and one of CPU), we are able to
provide a detection solution that satisfies the initial requirements and to detect
malware at runtime with F-measure of 0.85, within 85.52 seconds of its execu-
tion, and with consumed average power of 20mW. Apart from observed features
containing enough information to discriminate between malicious and benign
applications, our results show that they can also be used to discriminate between
diverse behavior of malware, reflected in different malware families. Using small
number of features we are able to identify the presence of the malicious records
from the considered family with precision of up to 99.8%. In addition to the
standalone use of the proposed detection solution, we have also used it in a hy-
brid scenario where the applications were first analyzed by a static method, and
it was able to detect correctly all the malware previously undetected by static
analysis with false positive rate of 3.81% and average detection time of 44.72s.
The method, we have designed, tested and validated, has been applied on a
smartphone running on Android Operating System. However, since in the design
of this method efficient usage of available computational resources was one of
our main criteria, we are confident that the method as such can be applied also
on the other battery-operated mobile devices of Internet of Things, in order to
provide an effective and efficient system able to counter the ever-increasing and
ever-evolving number and a variety of malicious attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mobile devices have conquered all aspects of personal and professional life: smart
watches are used to track our daily activities and the quality of our sleep; mo-
bile applications are used to perform financial transactions; vehicles contain a
significant amount of interconnected computational elements that are used to
control their functionality, ranging from fuel injection to infotainment. Criti-
cal infrastructures, such as smart grids and public transport, also make use, at
different levels, of mobile and battery-operated devices. With the widespread
adoption of Internet of Things enabled devices, the presence of mobile compu-
tational elements is growing even faster and, the focus of Internet security is
shifting from the desktop and the data centers to mobile and IoT devices. It is
already estimated that the number of connected devices will continue to grow
both in volume and variety, and, that by 2020 it may reach 20 billion according
to Gartner [2017].
Widespread adoption of smart mobile devices and their increased usage for
personal and business purposes, attracted the attention of attackers, mainly crim-
inals, and increased their interest in abusing these devices in order to gain profit,
collect private and sensitive data, or disrupt users. This reflects in an increase
of malware, by which we consider any malicious software that gains access to
a device for the purpose of stealing data, damaging the device, or annoying the
user, as reported by Felt, Finifter, Chin, Hanna and Wagner [2011]. Malware
is currently one of the most relevant security problems of mobile devices, since
number of encountered malicious samples is constantly on the rise, and, accord-
ing to McAfee Labs Threats Report [2017], total mobile malware grew by 79%
in the past four quarters to reach 16.7 million samples. Additionally, as stated
in 2016 Trend Micro Security Predictions Micro [2015], 3 out of 4 applications
used in China are believed to contain malware.
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2The increase of malware, calls for an increase in the effectiveness of mal-
ware detection systems. Although mobile malware detection systems are used
in environments with limited computational resources, in order to be adopted in
practice and to help users to defend against malicious infections, they have to
fulfill a set of requirements. First requirement is high detection accuracy, with-
out producing too many false positives and without disturbing regular usage of
the device. Then, an infection with malware should be detected as early as pos-
sible in its execution, in order to minimize potential damage. Additionally, the
overhead on battery and computational resources consumption due to detec-
tion system should be negligible. Finally, the detection system should provide
information on which of the various types of malware are executing, in order
to enable better understanding of severity of the attack and to propose possi-
ble countermeasures. However, with the increased number of malware samples
and a currently existing plethora of malicious behaviors, these are challenging
tasks, that are additionally complicated with the fact that constrained resources
and battery-operated nature of mobile devices significantly limits their ability to
run complex malware detection systems, as stated in Zhou and Jiang [2012], so
in most practical scenarios the trade-offs between the mentioned requirements
have to be considered.
Two existing ways to detect malware are static and dynamic analysis. Static
analysis is based on the offline investigation of the applications by means of static
features, that can be analyzed without the execution of a program. Although it
is efficient, it cannot cope with increased number of malware samples and their
variations. It is prone to obfuscation, and alone may no longer be sufficient to
identify malware, as reported in Moser et al. [2007]. The other method, dy-
namic analysis, is based on observing dynamic features, that change during the
execution of the program. Since it is focused on observing systems behavior at
runtime, in such a way malware cannot easily hide. Although in the most of the
proposed detection solutions these two methods are considered separately, ac-
cording to McAfeeLabs [2016], “Security software should include dynamic analysis
to flag rogue actions regardless of initial binary inspection because static scanning
goes only so far.” However, dynamic analysis and its usage at runtime require
algorithms that are frequently too complex for battery-operated mobile environ-
ments. Additionally, most of the currently proposed dynamic detection methods,
apart from being computationally complex, provide the ability to detect only
complete applications as malicious or benign, without providing any insights on
which parts of the application executions are actually malicious, neither to which
group of malware they belong to. Understanding which parts of the executions
are malicious is useful for better training of malware detection systems. Addi-
3tionally, having insights about the behavior of the parts of the applications, helps
a detection system to build an overall image of trustworthiness of the executing
software and, if needed react very early if the system is potentially compromised
and the detection time is of the utmost importance, or react when a certain con-
fidence is built, in scenarios where high detection accuracy and low false positive
rates have priority. Identification of what type of malware could be running on a
mobile device is important, in order to understand better the goal of the attack
and how it aims to infect the device, to put in place suitable countermeasures,
and potentially minimize the damage the attack can cause. However, having
in mind the constrained computational environment of mobile devices, runtime
detection of malware and, particularly, identification of type of malware being
executed (malware classification) are challenging tasks, and most of the exist-
ing works fail to provide optimized solutions that balance well between high
malware detection accuracy, accurate malware classification, early detection of
malware and low resource consumption.
Most malware infections happen when users download and start applications
that contain hidden malicious payloads. This can happen either by chance, when
users are tricked to download some content via fishing or social engineering
methods, or intentionally, when users try to avoid official version of applications
that cost money and instead download their free versions available on third mar-
kets. Additionally, malicious content can be downloaded even after the applica-
tion installation during its update or can be hidden in a legitimate application
and activated only in certain conditions.
Malware, as a widespread threat, is present in a variety of mobile devices and
almost all mobile operating systems. However, the ones that are particularly af-
fected are mobile devices running on Android Operating System (Android OS).
This is the case due to the widespread usage of Android OS and its dominance on
the mobile market. Having in mind widespread usage of Android OS not only in
mobile phones, but also smart TVs, smart watches, and as a potential candidate
for future IoT standard operating system, protection of Android devices from
malware is a relevant security problem that has to be addressed. In addition,
detailed analysis of Android malware, performed by Zhou and Jiang [2012], re-
vealed that the dynamic loading ability of both native code and Android-specific
Dalvik code are being actively abused by existing malware. Having in mind all
the considered scenarios of malicious payload, the most suitable way to detect it
is dynamically at runtime, during applications executions on the device.
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1.1 Main Characteristics
In this thesis we focus on design, test and validation of a malware detection sys-
tem suitable for resource-constrained mobile devices. The system has following
characteristics:
a) it is suitable to be used at runtime on resource-constrained devices
b) it maximizes detection performance
c) it minimizes detection time
d) it is able to identify at runtime parts of malicious applications
e) it is able to identify at runtime complete malicious applications
f) apart from discriminating between benign and malicious behavior, it is able
to discriminate also between diverse behavior of malware
g) it can be used as a standalone method or in addition to static methods, as a
part of a hybrid solution to malware detection problem
h) it can be demonstrated on high-impact operating system such as Android OS.
1.2 Main Contributions
The main assumptions that we consider are that the observed environment is sta-
tionary and that the malicious payload is triggered in the observed environment
Towards design of the envisioned detection system, under these assumptions, we
tackled and contributed to the following research problems:
• Design of a methodology that performs malware detection on device and,
only when a potential attack is detected, sends information about it to a re-
mote server to perform malware classification, taking into account a trade-
off between low resource consumption and suitability for battery-operated
devices on one side, and on the other, the accurate identification of mal-
ware at runtime and its accurate classification
• Design of a methodology for efficient and effective detection of mobile mal-
ware at runtime for resource-constrained devices
• Creation of a comprehensive database consisting of execution records of
both malicious and benign applications
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• Identification of the set of the most indicative dynamic features to be ob-
served in order to discriminate between malicious and benign behavior
• Identification of the set of the most indicative features for discrimination
between different malicious behavior (malware classification)
• Design and development of detection algorithms suitable for resource- con-
strained environment and able to detect parts of malicious applications
• Design and development of detection algorithms suitable for resource- con-
strained environment and able to detect complete malicious applications
at early stage of their executions
• Investigation of the importance of the sampling period of monitoring in-
frastructure (i.e., how often the behavior of the apps is monitored to de-
tect malware) for efficient malware detection and evaluation of the system
power consumption with respect to it
• Evaluation of the system detection performance with respect to detection
accuracy, detection time and power consumption
• Description of functional dependencies between detection quality and de-
tection time, detection quality and resource consumption, and detection
time and resource consumption
• Evaluation of designed and developed detection methods in a hybrid sce-
nario, where the observed applications passed static analysis first
• Demonstration of the application of detection methods to high-impact op-
erating system such as Android OS.
1.3 Thesis Outline
With increased interest of attackers to abuse mobile devices, the number of at-
tacks performed by malicious software is rising, so as the types and varieties of
existing threats. In order to deal with this increase and to protect mobile devices,
different mobile malware detection solutions are proposed. In Chapter 2, we dis-
cuss the existing mobile threats and proposed detection solutions. More in detail,
in Section 2.1 we explain: rootkits, ransomware, bots, financial malware, logic
bombs, viruses, worms and Trojan horses, that are the most present malware
types in mobile devices. Currently, there are two ways to cope with the existing
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malware: through static or dynamic analysis. We discuss the existing approaches
based on these two methods in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, respectively.
In Chapter 3, we present the approach we propose in order to achieve an
efficient and effective detection of malicious parts of applications, complete ma-
licious applications and their intentions (malware families they belong to). Our
main goal is to provide malware detection solution that can be suitable for run-
time usage on resource-constrained mobile devices and that can detect malicious
attacks in the early stage of their execution. To outline of the approach we intro-
duce in order to reach this goal is given in Section 3.1. One of the most influential
aspects of the proposed methodology is identification of the features that are in-
dicative of the presence of mobile malware. In Section 3.2 we describe the origin
of features that we observe in our system, the reasoning behind it and the motiva-
tion behind performing feature selection as a separate task. Then, in Section 3.3
we describe the proposed malware detection module and the approach we use in
order to perform efficient detection of malicious records, detection of malicious
applications and detection of groups of malicious records (sub-traces). In Sec-
tion 3.4 we discuss the proposed malware classification module. The approach
we propose and evaluate in this thesis is dynamic and can be used as a standalone
malware detection system. However, it is also possible to use it as a part of a hy-
brid approach, in which, we would first use a static detector to perform offline
investigation of the application’s intentions, and then, only if the application is
marked as benign, we would run it on a phone, observe its characteristics at run-
time, and warn users in case it starts to perform malicious actions. In Section
3.5 we describe the characteristics of such a hybrid approach. Finally, in Section
3.6, we summarize the main properties of the malware detection approach we
propose.
In Chapter 4, we describe the experimental setup we have implemented for
the mobile devices running Android OS, the dataset that we used, and the fea-
tures we collected. The experiments were performed using both benign and ma-
licious applications. The collection of these applications is described in Section
4.1. By executing the collected applications in the Android OS environment and
observing their influence on system parameters of devices we obtained a set of
execution traces that we store in a database that is described in Section 4.2. The
system parameters taken into account (memory, CPU, network usage and system
calls) are listed in Section 4.3 and the methods used in order to perform their
extraction and selection of the most indicative ones are given in Section 4.4. For
the evaluation of the power consumption of the developed detection methods
we used the setup described in Section 4.5.
In Chapter 5 we present the obtained results on detection of malicious ex-
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ecution records, malicious applications, discrimination between different mal-
ware families and detection of malicious parts of the applications. The identi-
fication of important features for malware detection and malware classification
tasks is first described in Section 5.1. Since the results obtained in the domain
of malware detection are one of the main contributions of the thesis, we discuss
them in Section 5.2, where we give detailed description of the selected indica-
tive features, detection performance of performed malicious records detection,
malicious sub-traces detection and of malicious applications detection. Together
with the malware detection, we also propose a methodology for malware clas-
sification, and the results obtained for this task we discuss in Section 5.3 where
we outline the features indicative for the presence of the observed malware fami-
lies and the detection performance of selected classifiers when these features are
used. When we apply our dynamic detection method on applications previously
scanned with static detection, in form of a proposed hybrid scenario, we achieve
high detection performance that we discuss in Section 5.4. The method we pro-
pose for the runtime detection of malware is based on a dynamic analysis and
usage of machine-learning methods, which means that it inherits some of their
disadvantages and that it has some limitations, that are discussed in Section 5.5.
To the best knowledge, the detection approach we propose, design and validate
is different in what it offers than all other state-of-the-art methods in various as-
pects. These aspects are discussed in Section 5.6 where the proposed method is
compared to the existing works in the field of mobile malware detection.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we conclude the thesis, and describe the future work.
Section 6.1 summarizes the obtained results and Section 6.2 outlines the steps
envisioned for the future.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art: Mobile Malware
Threats and Solutions
Mobile systems are often network connected, and this connectivity can be ex-
ploited to attack them, as stated by Clark and Fu [2012]. A common way of
performing security attacks on computers and different types of devices is to in-
ject malicious software called malware.
As pointed out by Viega and Thompson [2012], malware has been found in all
kinds of cyber-physical systems over the years. It has the goal of stealing sensitive
information from users, taking control over the operating system, and damaging
or even completely disabling the device. Malware can be used to directly attack
devices or as an enabler for other attacks. Devices may get infected in differ-
ent ways. Malicious software can be covertly installed as pointed out by Khan
et al. [2012], and often with the collaboration of unaware users through the in-
stallation of applications. It has been shown in Percoco and Schulte [2012] that
even applications downloaded from official websites may contain hidden mali-
cious portions of software. Other ways to install malware on devices include
the exploitation of operating system vulnerabilities (e.g., through the Internet
connection, e-mails, videos or websites).
The rise of mobile, connected devices led to a plethora of mobile malware
opportunities, exploiting known and creating new attack vectors, as stated in
literature in Dunham [2008], in Delac et al. [2011], and in Guo et al. [2007].
For the second consecutive year, mobile devices are perceived as IT security’s
weakest link, according to CyberEdge Group [2015], and, as pointed out in In-
ternet Security Threat Report Volume 20 [2015], the threats, that were previously
mostly concern of governments, financial institutions, and security vendors, are
becoming more relevant in small enterprises and in personal lives. The same
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report also states that the focus of Internet security is shifting from the desktop
and the data center to the home and Internet of Things, the pocket, the purse,
and, ultimately, devices and infrastructure of the Internet itself.
In the remaining part of this chapter we discuss the most relevant mobile
threats up to date and we survey existing detection solutions. A deeper and
broader analysis about issues and techniques for securing the Android platform
may also be found in two extensive and recent surveys by Faruki et al. [2015]
and by Tan et al. [2015].
2.1 Mobile Threats
The most severe threat that can affect mobile devices, as stated in Milosevic, Fer-
rante and Regazzoni [2015], is malware. It is being able to completely damage a
device or enable further attacks on the device that can perform unwanted actions.
Most present malware types in mobile devices are rootkits, ransomware, bots, fi-
nancial malware, logic bombs, viruses, worms and Trojan horses (Trojans). More
details about each of them are as follows:
• Rootkits are a type of malware that is able to access parts of software for
which regularly it does not have privileges. The access to privileged area is
usually enabled by performing an attack on the system, either by exploiting
systems vulnerabilities or guessing users passwords. Once the attacker has
the access to the root privileges of the system, the system is practically
under full control of him or her and is prone to further manipulation. Due
to this, rootkit detection is a challenging task. In the domain of Android
malware, using root exploits is a common way to perform attack on the
system. Zhou and Jiang [2012] performed detailed analysis of Android
malware from this perspective and based on the obtained results stated that
out of 1,260 analyzed malicious applications representative for Android
malware landscape, 463 of them (36.7%) embed at least one root exploit
and 378 samples came with more than one root exploit.
• Ransomware is malware that locks the content of the users device, and
then asks the user to pay money, ransom, in order to enable normal usage.
There are different ways to perform such attack on the system, starting
from locking the screen of a device, or by using fake anti-virus software
that, once installed on users device, would prompt the message that the
device is under attack and ask for money in order to remove the discov-
ered infection. More advanced ransomware encrypts the data stored on the
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device and asks for money in order to provide the decryption key. In the
last few years an increased number of ransomware attacks was recorded.
More in detail, according to McAfee Labs Threats Report [2017] the num-
ber of total ransomware samples grew 59% in the past four quarters to
reach 9.6 million samples. According to McAfee Labs [2016], 2016 will be
remembered as “the year of ransomware,” confirming the predictions of
exponential growth of these kinds of attacks from previous years given by
Infosec Institute [2016]. Recent events, such as the WannaCry ransomware
attack of May 2017 in which over 200,000 computers in more than 150
countries were rendered unusable with ransom demands 1, demonstrated
that these predictions might be beaten in 2017.
• Bots are self-propagating malware with the goal to infect host machine
and later connect to a server, bot master, and follow the obtained orders
from it. Botnet is a network consisting of many host devices infected with
bots, being available to perform Denial of Service attacks, send spam mes-
sages or simply enable further infections on host devices. Additionally, bots
collect information from host devices and send it to the bot master. The
collected information can be related to private users data, financial transac-
tions, user passwords, etc. Botnets, that until recently were mostly related
to personal computers, since 2010 also attack mobile devices. One example
of mobile bots with a goal to propagate malware is Plankton, described in
detail in Zhou and Jiang [2012], that appeared in 2011 and currently has
more than 2000 different variants. In 2016 we have witnessed the biggest
DDoS attack ever seen, as stated by Internet Security Threat Report Vol-
ume 22 [2017], performed by Mirai botnet, that rendered unusable many
leading websites, including Netflix, Twitter and PayPal. Mirai botnet was
performed using IoT devices with poorly implemented security practices,
that emphasized the need to increase security measures in IoT devices and
protect them against similar threats in future.
• Financial Malware has a goal of collecting accounts credentials and send-
ing them to the attackers. Current Android malware can intercept text mes-
sages with authentication codes from customers bank and forward them
to attackers. Also, fake versions of legitimate banks mobile applications
exist, hoping to trick users into giving them account details. Number of
encountered attacks related to financial malware is increasing. This can
be especially seen in the increase of banking malware, that attacks online
1http://wapo.st/2pKyXum?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.6887a06778fa
12 2.1 Mobile Threats
banking customers. According to IT Threat Evolution In Q2 2015 [2015],
number of encountered banking attacks has increased from 71% to 83%
from first to second quarter of 2015.
• Logic Bombs are pieces of code intentionally inserted into a software sys-
tem that set off a malicious function only when specified conditions are
met. When activated, a logic bomb can perform different actions: display
spam messages, delete or corrupt data, execute pieces of malicious code or
have other undesirable effects.
• Viruses are the type of malware that propagates by inserting themselves
into another program and spreading together with it. The level of sever-
ity of viruses can vary from low, for example corrupting some files on the
system, to high that can disable or even completely damage the operating
system. Viruses are spreading together with the program they are attached
to. It can happen by using Wi-Fi network, bluetooth, message or email
attachments.
• Worms, as opposed to viruses that depend on a host program to be spread,
operate more independently of other files. Still, same as viruses they are
able to self-replicate and spread. In mobile devices, worms spread without
users knowledge, by using existing communication channels: SMS, MMS,
and bluetooth. First mobile malware, Cabir, that appeared in 2004 and
was able to spread itself via bluetooth, was a worm developed for Symbian
Operating System and ARM architecture. Since then different variants of
worms exist in mobile devices, causing users information leakage, disrup-
tion of services or sending premium rate messages.
• Trojans are type of malware that appears as a legitimate software, but ac-
tually has malicious intents. Also, they are able to open a backdoor in a sys-
tem, thus enabling further attacks. Due to their similarity with legitimate
applications, detection of Trojans is a challenging task. At the same time,
they are one of the most present malware type in mobile devices, especially
devices running on Android Operating System. One of the most famous is
Spitmo, a Trojan which steals information from the infected smartphone,
monitors and intercepts SMS messages from banks and uploads them to a
remote server, as described by Zhou and Jiang [2012].
Apart from malware, threats that can also appear in mobile devices are classi-
fied as grayware or madware. According to Internet Security Threat Report Volume
20 [2015], out of the 6.3 million applications analyzed in 2014, one million were
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classified as malware, while 2.3 million were classified as grayware. A further 1.3
million applications within the grayware category were classified as madware.
• Grayware are all the programs that do not contain viruses and are not
obviously malicious but that can be annoying to the user, like for exam-
ple adware (advertising-supported software), that automatically delivers
advertisements.
• Madware consists of different aggressive techniques developed in order
to place advertisement in mobile devices, for example photo albums and
calendar entries and to push messages to notification bar.
Apart from the listed threats, there are various other forms of malware, gray-
ware, and madware that have different names and different forms. Some ex-
amples are phishing, that is looking for someone to get "hooked" and load mal-
ware/grayware or madware and spoofing, that is pretending to be someone else
(e.g., user’s bank), win trust and exploit the credentials. Although the number
of all possible threats that can happen in mobile devices is much higher, in this
chapter we focus on and discuss in more detail the ones related to mobile mal-
ware, since it is currently the threat that can cause the most severe damage to
devices.
When it comes to security of other IoT mobile devices, we have already seen
attacks in ATMs, home routers, cars and medical equipment, but, according to
McAfee Labs Threats Report [2015], these are just beginnings of attacks on IoT.
Most of these devices connect via bluetooth that is known to suffer from many
security flows, as stated in 2016 Threats Prediction [2015]. Apart from being able
to collect data stored on these devices, attackers can also abuse their connections
to smartphones. Symantec in Internet Security Threat Report Volume 20 [2015]
discovered that 20% of applications related to health sent personal information,
logins, and passwords over the wire in clear text.
In addition to the expansion of the existing attacks, also appearance of new
ones is expected in the next years. According to threats prediction in New Rules:
The Evolving Threat Landscape in 2016 [2015], some of the threats that will be-
come more aggressive and widespread in coming years are following: the rise
of machine-to-machine attacks, propagation of worms in headless devices, and
two-faced malware.
• Machine-to-Machine Attacks will take advantage of connected systems of
mobile devices like connected medical devices and their host applications,
connected home automation, smart TVs, and also connected home routers.
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• Worms in Headless Devices refer to foreseen spread of worms within less
complex devices, like smartwatches, by means of communication proto-
cols.
• Two-faced Malware is type of malware designed to execute an innocent
task to avoid detection system, and then, once it bypassed security checks,
execute its malicious payload.
2.2 Existing Malware Detection Solutions
With increased number of mobile threats the need to protect from them is grow-
ing, resulting in higher demand for effective detection systems. CyberEdge Group
[2015] indicates marked growth in the usage of anti-virus and anti-malware so-
lutions for mobile platforms, which went from a 36% rate of use in 2014 to 45%
in 2015. Although number of threats is observed in variety of mobile devices,
most of existing malware is targeting smartphones. Due to this reason, most of
current solutions, static and dynamic, are provided for them. In the rest of this
section we discuss these solutions.
2.2.1 Static Detection
Static methods are focused on analysis of static features of applications (e.g.,
granted permissions, API calls, source code debugging) and discrimination be-
tween malware and benign applications based on this information.
One subgroup of static detection is signature-based, that is commonly used
in current anti-virus and anti-malware solutions. It is based on the generation
of representative signatures for existing malware samples and maintenance of a
database consisting of them. Once the signature is recognized, malware is de-
tected with high confidence. Although the number of false positives with such
systems is low, they heavily rely on the maintenance of a database with signa-
tures. Namely, it has to be frequently updated with new signatures that appear on
the market. In mobile environment, this is difficult due to the fact that the device
is not constantly connected to the Internet with high bandwidth, that sometimes
is connected with mobile data that is charged, or that the device does not contain
enough memory to store all available malware signatures.
The analysis of the effectiveness of the four representative mobile anti-virus
software (AVG, Lookout, Norton, and Trend Micro) performed by Zhou and Jiang
[2012], showed not so encouraging results of the detection performance of the
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used software on the introduced Malware Genome dataset containing 1,260 ma-
licious samples from 49 malware families; AVG detected 689 in 32 families ob-
taining detection accuracy of 54.7%; Lookout detected 1,003 malware samples
in 39 families making it a detection accuracy of 79.6%; Norton was able to de-
tect 254 samples in 36 families thus being only 20.2% accurate; and Trend Micro
detected 966 samples in 42 families, obtaining thus accuracy of 76.7%. Based
on this analysis, Zhou and Jiang [2012] stated that traditional content-signature-
based approaches have been demonstrated not promising at all to cope with rapid
growth and proliferation of malware.
Drebin, static approach to mobile malware detection, was proposed by Arp,
Spreitzenbarth, Hubner, Gascon and Rieck [2014] where high detection accu-
racy is achieved by using features from the manifest file and feature sets from
disassembled code. Using these features and Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
classification algorithm, the authors perform the evaluation of the method on
123,453 applications, out of which 5.560 are malicious, and where the method
was able to detect 94% of the malware with false positive rate of 1%. Detection is
performed on the phone and the reported overhead is sub-linear as its overhead
increases with O(
p
m), where m is the number of analyzed bytes.
DroidMat, the mechanism presented by Wu et al. [2012], also uses static
features including permissions, Intent messages passing and API calls to detect
malicious Android applications. The classification method that this system uses
is kNN clustering and the detection is performed on the server, reporting linear
overhead in the size of the problem. For the evaluation of the approach 1,500
benign and 238 malicious applications were used with the reported precision of
0.9674, recall of 0.8739, and F-measure of 0.9183.
DroidAPIMiner is another approach to static malware detection, presented by
Aafer et al. [2013]. It is a machine-learning based approach to Android malware
detection that is taking into account only features from API calls. The detec-
tion performance of this method was evaluated on a dataset consisting of 20,000
applications, out of which 3,987 malicious, and the highest achieved detection
accuracy is of 99% and a false positive rate is of 2.2%, that was achieved using
kNN classifier. In addition to kNN, the authors also experimented with two de-
cision trees based algorithms, and SVMs, but kNN outperformed them in terms
of accuracy and true positives rate.
FlowDroid, presented by Arzt et al. [2014], is a static taint analysis based tool,
that models applications life-cycle and callback methods and using these models
detects sensitive privacy leaks in Android applications. The method is evaluated
on Stanford SecuriBench Micro Livshits [2013], a set of micro benchmarks orig-
inally intended for web-based applications, and on DroidBench, proposed by the
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authors. The achieved detection performance on DroidBench is precision of 86%
and recall of 93%, on SecuriBench Micro reported recall is 96% and reported
false positives are nine.
In the AppContext, introduced by Yang, Xiao, Andow, Li, Xie and Enck [2015],
the authors propose to discriminate between the malicious and benign behaviors
looking at the contexts that trigger security-sensitive behaviors. They start from
a set of actions previously defined as suspicious and then add a context by consid-
ering which category of input controls the execution of such suspicious actions.
The AppContext is evaluated on a dataset consisting of 202 malicious applica-
tions and 633 benign applications from the Google Play Store, and it achieves
detection accuracy of 95% and recall of 87.7%.
Truong et al. [2013], as a feature for detecting susceptibility of a device to
malware infection, use a set of identifiers representing the applications on a de-
vice is used. The assumption is that the set of applications used on a device
may predict the likelihood of the device being classified as infected in the future.
The authors, that used Multinomial Naive Bayes classifier on 103,695 applica-
tions, concluded that although the set of other applications installed on the phone
might be an indicator for the presence of malware, observing just this feature is
not enough to give precise answer about device being attacked.
Kirin, presented by Enck et al. [2009], is an analysis tool that performs An-
droid malware detection by flagging an application as suspicious according to
a set of predefined rules based on the combinations of requested permissions.
Also Apple, Google, and Nokia use application permissions and review to protect
users from malware. The effectiveness of these mechanisms against malware is
evaluated by Felt, Finifter, Chin, Hanna and Wagner [2011], where sending SMS
messages without confirmation or accessing unique phone identifiers like the
IMEI are determined as promising features for malware detection as legitimate
applications ask for these permissions less often, as stated by Felt, Greenwood
and Wagner [2011]. Also checking if groups of certain permissions are present is
shown to be useful in the detection of malware. For example, nearly one third of
applications request access to user location but far fewer request access to user
location and to launch at boot time. Features derived from permissions usually
do not provide good detection performance of malware, also because malware
writers often use a technique called overpermission; by using this technique, ap-
plications ask for a broad range of permissions, even though they would not be
required by the tasks that they perform; additional permissions are exploited by
dynamically loaded malicious payloads.
The analysis of disassembled code, more precisely of opcodes, is proposed
by Canfora, Mercaldo and Visaggio [2015], where features related to the op-
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code occurrences are considered. More precisely, the authors classify malware
using a set of features which count the occurrences of a specific group of op-
codes extracted from the smali Dalvik code of the application under analysis.
Smali is the language that represents the disassembled code for Dalvik Virtual
Machine. The proposed approach is evaluated on a dataset containing 11200
applications on which it showed detection precision of 93%. The considered op-
codes, that have been chosen as representative of the alteration of the control
flow, are following six: move, jump, packed-switch, sparce-switch, invoke, and if.
Additionally, the method proposed by Canfora, De Lorenzo, Medvet, Mercaldo
and Visaggio [2015] demonstrates that the sequences of opcodes are effective in
detecting Android malware. In this approach, the authors consider a binary clas-
sification problem in which an input application a has to be classified as malware
or benign using the occurrences of two opcodes as features (i.e., 2-grams). The
authors evaluated the approach on a dataset composed of 11,120 applications,
out of which 5,560 were malware. The used classification algorithms were SVMs
and Random Forest (RF), out of which RF performed better on the observed task
and obtained detection accuracy of 96.88%. RF is a combination of different tree
classifiers as discussed by Breiman [2001].
In the nutshell, static detection methods are effective in terms of resource
consumption. Usually they are less computationally intense than dynamic meth-
ods and that they do not need applications to be run for identifying the infection
according to Martinelli et al. [2016]. They are also fast when automated tools
are used. Additionally, since the analysis can be performed offline and without
need to execute programs and collect the traces of behavior, it is more convenient
for large scale experiments with high number of applications, both benign and
malicious, that gives more confident results about the detection performance of
the proposed systems. Such large scale experiments, in dynamic scenario where
applications have to be executed and run for some time, are not realistic, and
thus usually smaller datasets than in static scenarios are used. The main prob-
lem of static analysis is that it is relatively easy to create a new malicious sample
that would be able to evade detection system based only on it. It is shown that it
is prone to obfuscation and cannot detect variations of existing malware samples
that are easy to create and distribute according to Moser et al. [2007]. Addi-
tionally, due to the nature of this approach that analyses the applications only
based on their static features, it is not able to detect malware that appears at run-
time. In this way users stay unprotected at runtime, in scenarios when they visit
a website that might contain malicious code, open malicious attachments, when
they click on a pop-up window, or when already installed applications perform
malicious update.
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2.2.2 Dynamic Detection
Dynamic detection is a promising candidate for mobile malware detection sys-
tems since it is able to detect variety of malicious samples that currently exist
on the market and is more resistant against previously unseen malicious samples
coming from existing malware families. The main advantage of this approach is
that dynamic system features are observed at runtime, such as for example sys-
tem calls and network behavior, and based on them and previously trained mod-
els, detection is performed. In this way, by observing the behavior of the system
at runtime, systems are more resistant to variety of existing malware samples
and more difficult to bypass. The reasoning behind is that while attackers can
obfuscate the code itself it is difficult to obfuscate its behavior. Additionally, if
attackers tried to evade detection by encrypting some parts of the application
source code, such trial will not be of use in case of dynamic detection in contrary
from static detection.
Dynamic detection mechanisms are used by Bose et al. [2008] to detect mo-
bile worms, viruses and Trojans. The authors start with the extraction of repre-
sentative signatures. Later on, a database with malicious patterns is created and
SVMs are used in order to train a classifier with both benign and malicious data.
The evaluation of both emulated and real-world malware shows that dynamic
detection not only results in high detection rates but also detects new malware
which shares certain similarity with existing patterns in the database. The eval-
uation of the real-world performance of the method is performed on two, at that
time, available Symbian worms: Cabir and Lasco.
Power consumption, monitored through battery usage, is also used as a dy-
namic feature to indicate the presence of mobile malware, as introduced by
Becher et al. [2011]. One of the proposed solutions, VirusMeter proposed by
Liu et al. [2009], monitors and audits power consumption on mobile devices
with a power model that characterizes power consumption of normal user be-
haviours. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the approach, the prototype
is developed on Nokia 5500 Sport and evaluated against malware samples Flex-
iSPY and Cabir, that were detected by the proposed approach with less than 1.5%
additional power consumption in real time. Kim et al. [2008] propose creation of
a database with power signatures, where a new power signature collected while
the system is used is compared with the ones already existing in the database.
This evaluation was performed using anomaly detection methods on Windows
mobile and for it four malware worms and one battery-depletion attack were
used. Although in the observed scenarios, where small number of malicious
samples is evaluated, battery usage related detection showed promising results,
19 2.2 Existing Malware Detection Solutions
to what extent modern malware can be detected on phones by monitoring just
the battery power, as stated by Becher et al. [2011], remains an open research
question.
SmartSiren, presented by Cheng et al. [2007], is a collaborative virus detec-
tion and alert system for smartphones. It performs statistical and abnormality
monitoring, detects abnormalities at both device and network level, and in case
alerts being detected issues alarm to the targeted population. Rather than focus-
ing on malware, the approach is tested and validated, via simulation, on viruses
spreading via Bluetooth and SMS and Windows Mobile 5.0 Smartphone Edition.
The dataset used consists of three weeks of SMS traces collected from Indian na-
tional cellular service provider and the implementation of two viruses Cabir and
Flexispy. The reported overhead is 33.6% of the total messages.
Schmidt et al. [2007] present the approach to identify the most representative
features to be observed on a phone running on Symbian Operating System and
then sent to the network so that anomaly detection is performed there. Following
five features are identified as informative: RAM Free, User Inactivity, Process
Count, CPU Usage, SMS Sent Count. The authors validated the importance of
the features by using as a dataset simulation of normal behaviour of 10 frequently
used applications at that time, and one malware sample.
Xie et al. [2010] propose a probabilistic approach to detection of malware
propagating through Bluetooth and messaging services. It observes unique be-
haviors of the mobile applications and the operating users on input and output
constrained devices, and builds a Hidden Markov Model to learn application and
user behaviors. Later, based on this knowledge, it identifies behavioral differ-
ences between malware and human users. The analysis, for which 346 SMS
sequences of benign users and 27 abnormal sequences, is performed on Linux-
based smartphone, using 16 features.
Shabtai et al. [2012] propose Andromaly, a framework for detecting mal-
ware that uses variety of features related to: touch screen, keyboard, scheduler,
CPU load, messaging, power, memory, calls, operating system, network, hard-
ware, binder, and LEDs, and compares False Positive Rate, True Positive Rate,
and accuracy of the following detection algorithms: Bayes Net, Decision Tree
J48, Histogram, K-means, Logistic Regression (LR), and Naive Bayes (NB). The
algorithms that outperformed the others in detection of Android malware were
LR and NB. The results were obtained using 40 benign applications and four de-
veloped malicious samples, since no real malicious applications were available
at that moment.
Ham and Choi [2013] perform feature selection on a set of run-time features
related to network, SMS, CPU, power, process information, memory and Virtual
20 2.2 Existing Malware Detection Solutions
memory. As a measure of features importance, Information Gain was used along
with four classification algorithms: NB, RF, SVMs, and LR. Results show that,
in this scenario, RF gives the best performance. Results have been obtained by
considering 30 benign and five malicious applications.
Spreitzenbarth, Freiling, Echtler, Schreck and Hoffmann [2013] present an
automatic way to detect malware by using combination of static and dynamic
approach towards malware detection. In order to extend coverage of dynamic
detection, static detection is used as a first step, where the authors take into
account applications Manifest file, decompiled code and requested permissions.
Further, they analyze the application in sandbox tracking native API calls of the
application taken into account. Malware samples taken into account are 136,000
applications from Asian and Google Play market and 7,500 malicious samples.
The system is not envisioned to be run on a mobile device, but instead is ac-
cessible via web interface for all the users that would like to test the suspicious
applications.
Work proposed by Burguera et al. [2011], is a crowdsourcing system that
uses real traces of application behaviour collected from users. The traces are
analysed in the network by usage of k-means clustering. Malware is detected by
investigation of system calls, and the authors argue that the monitoring system
calls are the most accurate way to detect malicious Android applications, since
they provide detailed overview on the events. Dataset used is consisting of Tro-
jan samples, more precisely, three samples of self-written malware and two real
malware application samples.
Dini et al. [2012] propose Madam, a Multi-Level Anomaly Detector for An-
droid Malware. It is a framework that detects intrusions and malicious actions on
Android devices. It does the detection by monitoring system OS events (system
calls) and the user activity/idleness. The evaluation of the system is performed
by using 10 real malware samples on Android Ice Cream Sandwich Version 4.1
Samsung Galaxy Nexus phone. Using thirteen features for the detection the ac-
curacy of 93% was obtained. The reported overhead of the approach is 3% of
memory consumption, 7% of CPU overhead, and 5% of battery. In order to use
Madam, rooting of a phone is required.
A work proposed by Oberheide et al. [2008] consists of two components: a
host agent and a network service. The host agent is acquiring files and sending
them to the network service, whereas the network service performs analyses us-
ing multiple detection engines in parallel to determine whether a file is malicious
or not. The evaluation of the approach is performed on two Nokia phones N800
and N95, and it showed that the proposed approach consumes less memory and
CPU due to the offloaded detection. However, as also stated by the authors, since
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the detection is completely offloaded from the phone and done on the server, it
rises privacy issues and also leaves users unprotected in scenarios where they are
disconnected from the network.
Another solution in which the detection is completely offloaded in the net-
work is ParanoidAndroid, proposed by Portokalidis et al. [2010], that uses the
anomaly detection principle. Based on phone execution traces, security checks
are performed on the synchronized copy of the phone that runs on a server. The
phone used in the evaluation of the method is HTC G1 phone, and on the server
side QEMU was used. The results show that using such approach battery life is
reduced by about 30% and CPU load by about 15%.
Many detection approaches have been developed which work on features
derived from system calls, or sequences of system calls, occurrences or frequen-
cies. CopperDroid, proposed by Reina et al. [2013], recognizes malware sam-
ples through a system calls analysis with a customized version of the Android
emulator in order to track system calls. In Wang et al. [2009], an emulator is
used to perform a similar task: the method is assessed on a dataset composed
of 1,600 malicious applications; 60% of the malicious applications belonging to
the Genome Project as well as the 73% of the malicious applications included in
the Contagio Dataset [2016] are identified correctly.
Canfora et al. [2013] propose a method to detect Android malware based
on three metrics, which evaluate the occurrences of a reduced subset of system
calls, a weighted sum of a subset of permissions required by applications, and a
set of combinations of permissions. In their experiment a sample of 200 mali-
cious applications and 200 benign applications are considered, and a 74% pre-
cision in the identification of malware is obtained. Canfora, Medvet, Mercaldo
and Visaggio [2015] propose also another approach to malware detection based
on system calls. The approach uses machine learning to discover connections
between malicious behavior (e.g., sending high premium rate SMS or ciphering
data for ransom) and their execution traces and then exploit obtained knowl-
edge to detect malware. As opposed to other systems, where a limited set of
system calls is taken into account, in this work, all system calls are considered so
as their sequences. The approach is tested with data coming from a real device,
with a dataset consisting of 20,000 execution traces and 2,000 applications and
obtains a detection accuracy of 97% (on previously unseen applications 94.9%).
In order to detect malware, 750 features related to system calls are taken into
account. Although the achieved detection accuracy is high, the detection time of
this approach is not reported, neither the resource consumption on a device.
The detection method presented by Isohara et al. [2011] uses data gathered
by an application log and a recorder of a set of system calls related to manage-
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ment of file, I/O and processes. A physical device with a modified Android 2.1
was used for the experiments and 230 applications, in greater part downloaded
from Google Play, were considered; among them, the method is able to detect
37 applications which steal personal data, 14 applications which execute exploit
code, and 13 destructive applications. For this method the modification of the
kernel is needed.
Monitoring of system calls in Android is also discussed by Bläsing et al. [2010].
The authors perform both static and dynamic analysis, disposing a module which
monitors system calls and logs the return value of each system call. The system
is not evaluated on devices, since it is created for analyzing Android applications
via cloud service.
Dimjaševic et al. [2016] propose a method to perform automatic classification
based on tracking system calls while applications are executed in a sandbox envi-
ronment. The analysis is performed on 4,289 malicious applications from Drebin
dataset proposed by Arp, Spreitzenbarth, Hubner, Gascon and Rieck [2014] and
on 8.371 benign applications from Google Play Store. The approach relies on
15.000 features, and using them trains RF, SVMs, LASSO regression analysis,
and ridge regression. The best results are obtained using RFs, and the accuracy
of 93% with a 5% benign applications classification error is achieved. The sys-
tem is developed relying on the Android Emulator, and its detection time and
resource consumption is not reported.
The increasing number of malicious infections by ransomware is rising con-
cerns about the effectiveness of current malware detection methods in their de-
tection. Due to this, some of the recently proposed mobile malware detection
methods, that we discuss in the remainder of this section, are proposed specifi-
cally for the ransomware detection scenarios.
The first method that introduced ransomware detection for Android is Hel-
Droid proposed by Andronio et al. [2015]. This tool includes a text classifier
based on NLP features, a lightweight smali emulation technique to detect lock-
ing strategies, and the application for detecting file-encrypting flows. The main
weakness of HelDroid is represented by the fact that it strongly depends on a
text classifier: as a matter of fact, the authors trained it on generic threatening
phrases, similar to those that typically appear in ransomware or scareware. This
strategy can be easily thwarted by means of techniques such as string encryption
and data ciphering introduced by Rastogi et al. [2013]. Furthermore, the pro-
posed method strongly depends on language dictionaries; this is the reason why,
as stated by the authors, when the analyzed ransomware is targeting non-English
speakers, the dictionary must be switched to a different language. In addition,
this method can be evaded by altering the occurrences of such words. For the
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performance point of view, they identify rightly 375 Android ransomware on a
dataset composed of 443 samples: 11 ransomware were not detected due to un-
supported language (e.g., Spanish, Russian) with 9 out of 12,842 false positives.
Yang, Yang, Qian, Lo, Qian and Tao [2015] propose a performance tool in
order to help to understand what can be done to cope with Android ransomware
detection. This tool provides the ability to dump the log of system messages,
including stack traces. However, this method remained at the level of a pro-
posal, with no implementation. Therefore, there are no results that can prove its
effectiveness.
Song et al. [2016] designed an approach with the aim of identifying mobile
ransomware by using process monitoring. They consider features representing
the I/O rate as well as the CPU and memory usage. They evaluate the proposed
method with only one ransomware sample developed by the authors, this sample
has the ability to encrypt the file by using AES.
An approach based on formal methods that is able to detect Android ran-
somware and to identify the malicious sections in the application code is de-
scribed by Mercaldo et al. [2016]. The authors evaluate a dataset composed of
2,477 samples with real-world ransomware and benign applications. Starting
from the payload behavior definition the authors formulate logic rules that are
later applied to detect ransomware. The main weakness of the proposed method
is represented by the human analyst effort required to build the logic rules: as
a matter of fact the proposed method foresees the payload identification but the
process rule building has to be done by hand, and as such, is time consuming
task.
As it can be seen from the previous description, several detection approaches
based on dynamic analysis of resources have been proposed for mobile devices.
They can be divided with respect to the types of detection techniques used, detec-
tion side (mobile device or cloud), operating systems, used datasets, so as com-
putational overhead of the used methods. In Milosevic, Regazzoni and Malek
[2017] we divide the existing approaches with respect to these characteristics.
Additionally, trustworthiness of mobile devices involves trustworthiness of both
hardware and software components. Trustworthiness of hardware is achieved by
addressing threats such as hardware Trojans or physical attacks, while software
security is generally affected by malware. While in this chapter we summarize
current security threats and existing solutions for mobile devices from the soft-
ware perspective, in Milosevic, Regazzoni and Malek [2017] we address security
problems also at hardware level.
According to Rastogi et al. [2013], dynamic methods are able to discriminate
malware even when its code is obfuscated. However, they need applications to
24 2.2 Existing Malware Detection Solutions
be run to identify malicious behaviour, potentially infecting the device, as stated
by Martinelli et al. [2017]. The other drawback of dynamic detection methods
is that such systems might be too complex for limited resources of mobile sys-
tems. In some cases, as previously mentioned, detection engines are offloaded
to a cloud or a server, thus imposing new challenges to the system related to
data transmission, communication overhead, data privacy, and lack of protec-
tion. Additionally, most of the proposed work, apart from detecting the presence
of malware, is not able to identify what type of malware is being executed nor
which parts of the malicious programs are actually malicious. Finally, detection
time and consumed power, that are one of the main challenges for the success-
ful deployment of dynamic detection methods at runtime, are in most cases not
reported along the obtained detection accuracy.
In order to extend the state of the art, we propose a detection approach that
takes into account constrained environment of mobile devices from its early de-
sign and is suitable for on-device runtime usage and monitoring against malicious
activity. In addition, our detection method investigates what parts of applications
are actually malicious and provides results on malware families to which the run-
ning application potentially belongs. Finally, it takes into account the detection
time as one of the main requirements and focuses on providing an early deci-
sion about the possible infection by malware. More detailed comparison of our
approach with state-of-the-art methods is given in Section 5.6.
Chapter 3
Proposed Methodology for Malware
Detection at Runtime
In this chapter, we describe the methodology that we propose in order to perform
both effective and efficient on device, at runtime, defense from mobile malware.
Our main idea is to design a malware detection and malware classification sys-
tems that are optimized for detection accuracy, detection time, and battery power
consumption. Each of these requirements is important for providing effective
and efficient defence against mobile malware, but up to date, to the best of our
knowledge, they have never been considered in such a comprehensive way in the
existing literature. In order to achieve good detection accuracy, we look at the
behavior of both malicious and benign applications as reflected by operating sys-
tem parameters related to its dynamic behavior (memory, CPU, system calls and
network behavior) and we identify the parameters that are the most indicative
for the presence of malware. Detection of malware is performed in two steps,
at execution records level first, and then at the application level. In this way,
we can understand what parts of executions are malicious in addition to which
applications are malicious. In order to minimize battery power consumption, we
decrease the number of observed system features to only the most indicative ones
and we use detection algorithms of low complexity suitable for mobile environ-
ment. Additionally, we investigate how important it is to select the most suitable
sampling period of monitoring infrastructure for the detection time, detection ac-
curacy and consumed power. Together with the most indicative features for the
detection of malware, during programs execution we also record the behavior
indicative for presence of different malware families, needed for malware clas-
sification task, and in case an alarm is triggered by detection module, we send
this information to the network for further analysis. In the remaining part of this
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chapter, we discuss the main components of the proposed detection system and
their characteristics.
3.1 Overview of Proposed Methodology
The proposed approach is analogous to general practitioner versus specialist ap-
proach to dealing with a medical problem, as we also discuss in Milosevic, Fer-
rante and Malek [2015]. Similarly to a general practitioner who, based on indica-
tive symptoms identifies potential illnesses and sends the patient to an appropri-
ate specialist, our detection system detects potential presence of infection with
malware and, once the symptoms are detected, it sends information needed for
specific analyses about which infection it is. The approach we propose in order
to perform this task consists of two parts: runtime detection, that is aimed to be
used on mobile devices, and offline development, that is aimed to be performed
offline on devices with more computational capabilities than mobile. In Figure
3.1 we depict the outline of modus operandi of the proposed approach, and in
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 the offline development of malware detection and malware
classification components, respectively.
As it can be seen in Figure 3.1, in our approach to malware detection, in order
to detect malicious records, a set of the most indicative features are monitored
and analyzed by using detection algorithms suitable for resource-constrained de-
vices. In order to detect malicious applications, we consider the history of exe-
cution records (marked as malicious or not). The features that are observed in
this module are related to dynamic aspects of applications behavior at runtime.
These features are easy to collect in terms of computational resources and at the
same time they are informative about the device behavior. In the offline phase,
depicted in Figure 3.2, it can be seen that after executions of the considered ma-
licious and benign application, we extract all the features of interest, perform the
feature selection methods on them to detect only the most indicative ones, and
then, using only the selected features we perform the training of classifiers.
As shown in Fig. 3.1, at runtime we store a set of features related to malware
classification and when an alarm is raised we send it to a remote server for fur-
ther analysis. The offline development of the classification module is depicted in
Fig. 3.3, where it can be seen that, after the execution of applications and col-
lection of their traces, we derive the set of the most indicative features for each
observed family and validate their importance using a suitable classifier. Then,
at runtime on the mobile device, we store a set of all the features identified as
the most indicative for observed families and, when an alarm is raised, we send
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Figure 3.1. Malware detection and malware classification system.
it into the network. In the offline phase different classifiers are tested and the
most suitable ones for observed families can be identified to be used for their
later detection. As a quantitative description of the quality of detection meth-
ods, we use F-measure (sometimes also called F-score), that is a harmonic mean
of precision (the fraction of detected instances that are relevant) and recall (the
fraction of relevant instances that are detected) and as such conveys the balance
between these two important aspects of the detection system. In addition, most
of the state-of-the-art methods also take into account F-measure and report the
obtained detection results with respect to it, thus the use of F-measure in our
scenario facilitates comparison to the related work.
The approach we propose in this thesis deals with detection of malicious soft-
ware and as such is designed, tested and validated with respect to its detection
performance and classification of malicious applications. Due to a potential sim-
ilarity of maliciously introduced errors and the errors that could happen by ac-
cident, it might happen that our detection approach can identify up to a certain
point also accidental errors. However, due to the fact that the accidental errors
are out of the scope of this thesis, we did not perform any evaluation of the ef-
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Figure 3.2. Oﬄine development of the malware detection mechanism.
Figure 3.3. Oﬄine development of the malware classification mechanism.
fectiveness of our approach with respect to their detection. Similar situation is
with comparison between failure prediction methods and our approach. Namely,
having in mind similar symptoms of failures and malicious attacks, it can happen
that the approach we propose is able to identify also other types of failures not
caused by malware, but due to the fact that a quantitative analysis of the detec-
tion performance of our method is performed only in the case of malware, we
cannot provide a quantitative measure of this effect.
3.2 Selected Features Monitoring
Systems based on dynamic features are more resistant to the obfuscation than
the ones based on static ones and are able to detect wider range of malware, as
discussed in Chapter 2. In order to achieve good quality of malware detection
represented in high F-measure, and thus high effectiveness of the approach, we
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use dynamic features related to the resource usage (memory, CPU, and network)
and system calls that reflect well the behavior of the program Ferrante et al.
[2016]. Simultaneously, the key enabler for the efficient detection on the phone
is monitoring of only a limited set of features at runtime. Decreasing number of
features lowers both the complexity of monitoring infrastructure and complexity
of detection algorithms influencing thus overall consumption of resources on
mobile devices. Due to these reasons, selection of a set of indicative features
that contain crucial information to discriminate between malicious and benign
applications on one hand, and are limited in number and can be used in resource-
constrained environment on the other, is a challenging task and the successful
identification of such a set is one of the most significant parts of the proposed
approach.
We perform the indicative features selection for both the malware detection
and malware classification tasks. The initial obtained results on the influence of
the observed features for both tasks is discussed in Section 5.1. These features
and their verification in the malware detection domain is explained in Section
5.2.1 and in the malware classification domain in Section 5.3.
3.3 Malware Detection
Our goal is to perform effective and efficient detection of both malicious parts
of the applications and the complete malicious applications, while taking into
consideration detection time. The outline of the envisioned malware detection
system, and the main components of the proposed detection systems, is given in
Figure 3.4.
Runtime detection consists of the four components: Selected Features Moni-
toring, Malicious Records Detection, Malicious Application Detection, and Alarm.
Selected Features Monitoring monitors suitable system parameters with a prede-
fined sample rate and extracts features from them. Malicious Records Detection
is used to categorize every execution record as malicious or benign. Malicious
Applications Detection classifies a complete application as malware or not. The
Alarm is used to raise an alarm in case a malicious application is found. This
module can be used to alert the user as well as to activate suitable countermea-
sures in the device. However, the main purpose of this module in our scenario, is
to inform an external cloud infrastructure about an infection potentially taking
place, and send the stored indicative features for malware classification task, in
order to be used to identify which malware family is attacking the device.
The training and the development of the components to be used at runtime is
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Figure 3.4. The proposed detection system’s oﬄine blocks and its runtime
components.
performed offline to guarantee the possibility of repeating experiments with dif-
ferent algorithms and parameters: the features to be monitored by the Selected
Features Monitoring block are identified by using a set of feature selection meth-
ods on previously recorded execution traces; the algorithm and the parameters to
be used in the Malicious Records Detection and in the Malicious Applications Detec-
tion, are trained by using the same recorded execution traces as input. Therefore,
it is necessary to execute applications, collect execution traces, and to extract fea-
tures: these actions are performed by the Execution of Applications and Feature
Extraction components, respectively. These components, together with the main
parts of the developed methodology, are described in the following part of this
chapter.
3.3.1 Malicious Records Detection
The main goal of the malicious records detection is to distinguish between execu-
tion records belonging to malicious and benign applications, using at the same
time the detection algorithm compatible with the limited resources of mobile
devices.
While most of the steps of the proposed approach are executed offline, the
detection algorithm is executed on the mobile devices; thus, it needs to be com-
patible with their limited resources. This is the reason why, for this task, we take
into account the complexity of algorithms, and only consider the ones with low
complexity. A brief description of classification algorithms that are potentially
suitable for the envisioned scenario follows:
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• Naive Bayes (NB) is a probabilistic classifier. It applies Bayes theorem mak-
ing an assumption that the features are independent. Under this naive
assumption it calculates probability of an unknown instance belonging to
each class and selects the one with the highest probability as an output, as
stated by John and Langley [1995].
• Logistic Regression (LR) is a linear classifier that calculates the conditional
probabilities of possible outcomes and chooses the one with the maximum
likelihood. Le Cessie and Van Houwelingen [1992] motivate its usage with
ridge estimator in order to further improve its prediction capability.
• A decision tree-based J48 classifier (J48), as stated by Hall et al. [2009],
is an open source implementation of C4.5 algorithm, a statistical classifier
that for each node of the tree, chooses the attribute of the data that the
most effectively splits its samples into subsets; the splitting criterion being
maximum information gain as introduced in Quinlan [1993].
The obtained results and performance of used malicious records detection
are presented in Section 5.2.2.
3.3.2 Malicious Applications Detection
In order to detect malicious applications running on a phone, it is needed to
observe behavior of execution records on the phone for certain amount of time
and then identify them as such. To perform this task, we propose to train a de-
tection algorithm named Malicious Applications Detection. We have designed a
method where, by keeping only a limited history of past execution record classifi-
cations, we are able to identify malicious applications effectively. The method is
based on a sliding window mechanism, observation period that changes ("slides")
over time. Namely, considering a sliding window of length n, the percentage of
records classified as malware in the last n instants of time is used to determine
whether an application is malware or not. To make the mechanism more ro-
bust, multiple results, obtained in disjoint sliding windows, are considered and
only when w windows are marked as malware, the application is classified as
malware. Figure 3.5 shows an example of this algorithm where a malicious ap-
plication is identified at sample 12, after the second (as w=2) window of length
n=4 is marked as malware. In this example, the threshold on the number of
malware records contained in each window is set to 70%.
The system proposed in Figure 3.4, is modular and each element can be
changed independently from the others, provided that the interfaces are pre-
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Figure 3.5. An example of the sliding window algorithm applied to a sequence
of classified execution records; window length, threshold, and number of checks
are set to 4, 70%, and 2, respectively.
served. In particular, algorithms for malicious records and malicious applications
detection can be changed without affecting the general functionality of the detec-
tion mechanism; when the malicious records detection mechanisms is changed,
a tuning of malicious applications detection parameters (window length, thresh-
old and number of checks) may be necessary to obtain the best possible results.
The monitoring mechanism can be changed without affecting other parts of the
system, provided that the features monitored remain unchanged.
The results we obtained using the proposed method and a malicious applica-
tions classifier as a standalone method are given in Section 5.2.4.
3.3.3 Detection of Malicious Sub-traces
While the previously discussed malicious records detection is used to classify ex-
ecution records, detection of sub-traces is related to the detection of groups of
execution records. The approach we propose jointly uses several dynamic fea-
tures related to system calls, memory usage, and CPU usage, to identify those
groups of records in which an application behaves maliciously. We use system
timestamps to connect our dynamic features, thus having knowledge about the
behavior of different parts of the system at any given time. While in the scenario
of malicious record detection, discussed in Section 5.2.2, we train classifiers us-
ing single execution traces, in this scenario we use groups of execution traces
originating from both malicious and benign applications.
In the state of the art it is shown that high detection accuracy can be achieved
using system calls. However, using system calls for identification of malicious
sub-traces is a challenging task due to complexity of their analysis and to the dif-
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ficulty of identifying anomalous parts in sequences of system calls consisting of
system call names and their attributes. In order to overcome this problem, and
to identify which parts of system calls traces are actually anomalous, we connect
them with memory and CPU features, that are real-valued numbers and can be
easily grouped into clusters with similar behavior. In this way, by having clusters
of similar memory and CPU behavior, we have added also system calls of similar
behavior, being able to further investigate them. Based on the information of
collected system calls, we train classifiers in the way it was proposed in Canfora,
Medvet, Mercaldo and Visaggio [2015] and then, during the application execu-
tions, by observing their memory and CPU behavior, we classify the sub-traces
with learned classifiers. The main steps of the proposed methodology, consist
of the application execution, the sub-traces collection, the sub-traces clustering
based on similarity between memory and CPU information, and the learning of
one classifier for each cluster.
In our method, given an execution of an application, a trace t = (o1, o2, . . . )
of observations is available. Each observation o is a set composed of:
• A timestamp,
• Values for CPU usage (total, user, kernel)
• Values for total memory usage (PSS, shared, private, heap allocation, free
heap)
• Values for Dalvik memory usage (PSS, shared, private, heap allocation, free
heap)
• Values for Native memory usage (PSS, shared, private, heap allocation, free
heap)
• A sequence s of system calls generated in the time frame delimited by the
current observation timestamp and the previous observation timestamp
The set of the 63 system calls has been used, that is chosen statically by se-
lecting the most occurring system calls performed by Android applications (as
proposed by Canfora, Medvet, Mercaldo and Visaggio [2015], where they pro-
vide high detection accuracy). Names of considered system calls are listed in
Section 5.2.3. The learning set is composed by pairs (t, l) where T is a trace and
l ∈ {benign,malicious} is a label which is benign if the application for which t
has been obtained is benign, and malicious otherwise.
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The main idea is to divide a trace in sub-traces and to classify each of them
by considering system calls. For this purpose, different classifiers are trained for
sub-traces that exhibit specific CPU and memory behaviors.
The method itself consist of a learning phase, in which the learning set L
is used to tune several inner parameters, and a classification phase, in which a
single trace t is analyzed.
The aim of the learning phase is twofold. First, to cluster sub-traces of the
labeled applications according to the corresponding behavior of the application
in terms of CPU and memory usage. Second, for each cluster, to train a classi-
fier based on system calls, so that it should be able to discriminate benign and
malicious sub-traces.
The goal of the classification phase is to give an indication on sub-traces t ′ of
traces t lasting time T about whether each t ′ is related to a benign or malicious
behavior during the corresponding interval. To achieve this goal we first obtain
the list of sub-traces. Then, for each sub-trace, we obtain the classification re-
sults from three nearest neighbours. The outcome of the classification is cast as a
value in [0, 1] which corresponds to the probability, that the sub-trace has a label
l = benign. After having the three classification outcomes, we combine them by
means of a weighted average in which the weights are determined by the corre-
sponding cluster accuracy. The underling motivation is to give more importance
to an outcome generated by a classifier which has been trained on a cluster for
which the difference between malicious and benign behaviors is sharper.
The results we obtained using the proposed approach to malicious sub-traces
detection are listed in Section 5.2.3.
3.3.4 Optimization of the detection solution by changing sampling
period of the monitoring infrastructure
The power consumption of developed methods is strongly related to the com-
plexity of the monitoring infrastructure in addition to the complexity of used
detection algorithms. In order to decrease this complexity, we focus on reducing
the number of monitored features and usage of only the most indicative ones.
However, an additional way to limit power consumption is through changing
sampling period. In order to achieve this goal, we start by evaluating system
performance when the sampling period is 2s, that is the minimum sampling pe-
riod that we can achieve with our current experimental setup, and then we also
investigated other meaningful sampling periods: 4s, 6s, 8s, 12s and 16s. In our
current setup the maximum sampling period that is compatible with the duration
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of the applications executions in our dataset and with the parameters considered
in our sliding window based detection algorithms is of 16s. The results we ob-
tained performing this evaluation are discussed in Section 5.2.5.
3.3.5 Application-specific usage of the proposed methodology
In this thesis, we focus on design, development and validation of a malware de-
tection system that takes into account detection precision and recall reflected in
F-measure, detection time and battery power consumption. In order to facilitate
comparing different solutions with respect to the multiple considered parame-
ters, we use a metric that summarizes these parameters. In our case, we opted
for a simple metric, shown in Equation 3.1, that includes F-measure, power, and
detection time with equal importance.
M =
F −measure
Normalized power × Normalized detect ion time (3.1)
The results we obtained with respect to this metric and the analysis of the opti-
mized configurations are described in Section 5.2.5. Although in our scenario we
consider the three mentioned requirements as if they are of the same importance,
we are aware that in different application-specific scenarios this can change, and
that in some domains the high detection accuracy is of utmost importance, in
some early detection has absolute priority, and in some the focus is on the low
power consumption. Even though we do not consider these three extreme sce-
narios in detail, using the methodology we propose the suitable solution can be
found for each of them, by replacing the evaluation metric depicted in Equation
3.1 with the metric representative for the application-specific scenario and per-
forming the rest of the analysis in the same way. In addition to balance between
detection accuracy, detection time and power consumption being different for
various application-specific domains, also the selection of the most representa-
tive metric varies based on the specific characteristics of the domain of interest,
as described in Antunes and Vieira [2015], where a set of guidance on the se-
lection of the most suitable metric is outlined. While this is a relevant research
problem, it is not the focus of this thesis and not the main goal of the introduced
metric. Namely, the main intention behind it in our scenario was to show how it
would be used, as a part of the proposed methodology, in the application-specific
domain once the suitable metric is known, rather than proposing its exact usage
across different domains. Besides usage of the proposed detection systems with
predetermined detection parameters, they can also be used in a form of an adap-
tive system, where based on the system dynamics the preferred parameters are
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decided and changed during runtime executions.
3.3.6 Computational overhead
Although in the experimental setup we focus on measuring the average power
consumed using our detection algorithms, the approach we propose to detect
malicious applications takes into account limited resources of battery-operated
devices in general. The algorithm used for detection of malware-related execu-
tion records, the reduced number of features considered, and the algorithm used
for classifying malicious applications, are all compatible with these conditions. In
fact, the algorithm chosen for malicious records classification has linear complex-
ity in the number of features; for the algorithm used for malicious applications
classification, very limited memory is required: for each running application,
only the latest n record classification results, where n is the window length, need
to be saved along with a counter of the number of past windows that have been
marked as malicious. Only simple operations are performed and the complexity
is linear with the window length. Both the number of features and the window
length are chosen to be small.
3.4 Malware Classification
As it can be seen in Figure 3.1, in order to achieve the goal of discrimination be-
tween malicious records belonging to diverse malicious behavior, thus malware
classification, we extend the approach depicted in Figure 3.4, so that, apart from
being able to detect malicious records, is also able to differentiate between dif-
ferent malware families. Namely, as depicted in Figure 3.1, at runtime, based on
the classification of execution records, malicious applications are detected and
an alarm is raised. Then, recorded indicative features are sent into network for
further analysis where malicious records classification is performed by using an
ensemble of classifiers, including a classifier for each malware family. The devel-
opment of the ensemble of detection methods is performed offline, as shown in
Figure 3.3.
In order to identify to which malware family the running applications belong,
we design a model that, based on the observed behavior, identifies the most in-
dicative features for each malware family taken into account. We call this set
of features behavioral signature of a family. Later, while looking at the behav-
ior of the system and comparing it with the stored behavioral patterns, we can
infer about the family that is being executed. It is our belief that creating be-
37 3.4 Malware Classification
havioral signatures in this way, rather then typical signatures of malicious code
samples, makes the detection system more resistant, because even if a sample is
re-packaged, as long as it exposes the same behavior, it will be identified with
the current signature, while in the other case a new signature would be required.
For this purpose, we observe features related to memory and CPU, and we
also take into account network behavior of the considered applications. Network
observation is included having in mind how different malware families interact
with network in different ways (some connect to an external server to obtain
further instructions, some send users sensitive data, etc) and assuming that this
information might be significant in discriminating them.
Also in this scenario, in order to remove irrelevant features, to decrease com-
plexity of monitoring infrastructure and required memory, we use feature selec-
tion as a separate step. In order to evaluate the importance of selected features
and find out whether they contain enough information to discriminate between
different families, we validate the ones selected as the most indicative by using
the Support Vector Machines (SVM) model, that is a supervised learning model
proven to be successful in many real world problems, that given a set of train-
ing examples, each marked for belonging to one of two categories (malicious
or benign), builds a model that assigns new examples into one category or the
other.
For the malware classification task, as aforementioned, we propose to offload
into the cloud the computation related to the discrimination between different
malware families. While in this way we decrease the computation load to be
run on the phone and we allow usage of more sophisticated detection methods
to identify the intention of running malware. We are aware that such approach
rises other potential problems, the main of them being related to the privacy
of users data. However, we believe that with the proposed method the privacy
of the users is not significantly endangered due to the fact that the data is sent
into a network only upon a detection of a possible attack and not constantly. In
addition, the implementation of this part of the methodology in the real-time
scenario would take into consideration the use of privacy-preserving methods in
order to further protect the users private data.
Based on the type of malware being identified, we propose to apply suitable
countermeasures. For example, the following ones can be considered:
• Malware that sends data over the Internet: new rules may be inserted in
the mobile device local firewall to prevent the application from sending
data; on Android devices, firewall is provided by Iptables 1 and rules can
1https://www.netfilter.org
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be changed dynamically; the application can be optionally terminated.
• Malware applications sending SMSs may be terminated and their permis-
sions may be changed so that, if the user starts them again, they are unable
to access SMS.
Additionally, SELinux discussed by Smalley et al. [2001], that is included by
default in Android since release 5.0, can be used to sandbox applications as also
suggested by Shabtai et al. [2010]. While it might not be possible to do it while
the applications are running, malicious applications can be terminated and the
new SELinux policy can be applied when they are restarted.
In this section, we discussed the proposed methodology for the malware clas-
sification task. One of the important aspects of the proposed methodology is the
selection of the suitable countermeasures and their communication to the device
under attack. With respect to this, we outlined a set of possible countermeasures
that could be suitable in the scenario of mobile malware detection. While de-
tailed analysis of possible countermeasures is also an interesting research prob-
lem, the main focus, in this section, was rather on the introduction of proposed
methodology for malware classification, the discussion on its main components
and their main purpose from more generic point of view. Further discussion on
detection of malware families and the initial results obtained using the proposed
method are given in Section 5.3. The more detailed analysis of the malware
classification related task and more precise response on the most suitable coun-
termeasures is left for the future work, as it is discussed in Section 6.2.2.
3.5 Hybrid Method
The method we propose is based on dynamic features and their observation in
order to discriminate malicious from benign applications. It is trained to de-
tect applications at runtime, so that even if the applications expose their behav-
ior later in the usage (for example in a scenario when the malicious payload is
downloaded after the application installation), it could catch it, as opposed to
static detection. However, in addition to the standalone usage of our method
on mobile devices where the applications are not previously analyzed by any
static approach, we proposed its usage also in a hybrid scenario, where the ap-
plications are first tested by a static detector based on the analysis of opcode
2-grams and then run on a device. For this purpose, we propose and evaluate a
hybrid detection method, where static analysis is performed when applications
are installed or updated and/or periodically (e.g., once a week), and dynamic
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detection, instead, is used at runtime while the applications are executed and in
a way described in Section 3.3. We depict the high-level workflow of the pro-
posed approach in Figure 3.6: On those applications that were not marked as
malicious by static detection and, therefore, allowed to execute, we use dynamic
detection at runtime, while applications are executed. The main idea behind the
proposed hybrid approach is to have the advantages of both static and dynamic
approaches and to reduce their disadvantages, discussed in Chapter 2.
Figure 3.6. High-level workflow of the proposed hybrid approach. The static
analysis consists of a classification using features obtained by the executable of
the application under analysis, while the dynamic one by a feature set obtained
when the application is running.
3.5.1 Static Analysis
We adopt the approach from Canfora, De Lorenzo, Medvet, Mercaldo and Visag-
gio [2015] for the static part of the proposed hybrid approach, due to its effec-
tiveness in detection of Android malware and reported high detection rate. In
this approach each application is pre-processed in order to obtain the numeric
values of frequencies of opcode sequences that are suitable to be processed by
the classifier. After pre-processing, the classifier undergoes the learning phase
in which it is trained by using a labelled dataset. After the learning phase, the
classifier can be used for the actual classification of the applications as malware
or benign.
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Dalvik virtual machine at runtime is able to run dalvik executables (.dex files).
However, for humans .dex files are unreadable, and to edit them we need to con-
vert this .dex files to a more understandable form, for which smali is used is this
scenario. Namely, converting a .dex file to smali (that is called baksmaling) gives
us readable code in smali language, that can be then modified and converted back
in .dex format. Also, from java source code we can create .smali representation
of it. In the considered scenario, if a is the Android application under analysis,
in the pre-processing phase of this method, the apktool 2 tool is first used in or-
der to extract from the .apk the Smali classes of the application under analysis
in form of .dex files; then, from these files a unique file containing the full set
of opcodes (without the relative argument and parameters) relative to all the a
application classes is obtained.
The frequency of 2-grams opcodes from the previously obtained unique file is
computed as follows: let O be the set of possible opcodes, and let O =⋃i=ni=1 Oi the
set of n-grams. If f (a, o) is the frequency of the n-gram o ∈ O in the application a:
f (a, o) is the number of occurrences of o divided by the total length of the opcode
sequences in a. Finally, the feature vector ~f (a) ∈ [0,1]|O | corresponding to a to
~f (a) = ( f (a, o1), f (a, o2), . . . ) with oi ∈ O is set. In order to consider n-grams
of the same method, the application code is split into chunks corresponding to
class methods.
In the next phase, named learning, a binary classifier C from two sets AM , AT
of malware and benign applications (the learning sets) is trained, respectively.
The learning phase is divided into a feature selection phase and the actual classi-
fier training phase. As previously stated, the considered n-grams is n = 2 because
a previous work of Canfora, De Lorenzo, Medvet, Mercaldo and Visaggio [2015]
demonstrated that the sequences of two consecutive opcodes obtain better per-
formance in identifying Android malware than with n = 1 and with other values
of n ranging from 3 to 5. At first the average frequencies f¯M(o) and f¯T (o) are
computed for each 2-gram o ∈ O on the malware and benign samples, as follows:
f¯M(o) =
1
|AM |
∑
a∈AM
f (a, o)
f¯T (o) =
1
|AT |
∑
a∈AT
f (a, o)
Then, the relative difference d(o) between the two average values is computed
2https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool
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as follows:
d(o) =
abs( f¯M(o)− f¯T (o))
max( f¯M(o), f¯T (o))
This relative difference is high if the 2-gram o is frequent among malware ap-
plications and infrequent among benign applications (and vice versa). Then,
the set O ′ ⊂ O of n-grams composed of the h n-grams with the highest values
of d(o) is build, where h is a parameter of the method proposed by authors.
The 2-grams that appear only in benign or malware applications are excluded,
so as the 2-grams that are redundant, and the reduced feature vector ~f ′(a) is
set corresponding to a using only the frequencies of the 2-grams in O ′, i.e.,
~f ′(a) = ( f (a, o1), f (a, o2), . . . ) with oi ∈ O ′. The second step of the learning
phase consists of training the actual classifier C using the reduced feature vectors
obtained from the applications in the learning sets and the corresponding labels,
for which the following classification algorithms are used: J48, NaiveBayes, and
LR.
In the last phase, named classification, according to the learned classifier C
is determined if an application a is labelled as malware or benign. To this end,
a is pre-processed as previously explained in order to obtain the reduced feature
vector ~f ′(a). Then, this vector, ~f ′(a), is used as an input to C and a is classified
into {malware, benign}. In the envisioned hybrid scenario, this step is run every
time a new application is installed or updated.
3.5.2 Dynamic Analysis
While for the static part of the hybrid approach, we use the described existing
model in the state of the art, for the dynamic part, we use our approach that
is based on a two-steps detection system of low complexity that first classifies
execution records, and then complete applications by relying on the past classi-
fications of execution record, that we previously introduced in Section 3.3.
The proposed hybrid approach is evaluated using ransomware malicious ap-
plications, since ransomware is type of malware that is currently one of the most
serious threats to security of mobile devices and is particularly on the rise in the
last two years, as stated in Section 2.1. The results obtained using this approach
on a representative ransomware and benign applications dataset are discussed
in Section 5.4.
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3.6 Key Properties of the Proposed Approach
In this section we discuss the main properties of the proposed approach. Having
in mind previously introduced overall methodology described in Section 3.1, the
selection of the indicative features outlined in Section 3.2, the proposed method-
ology for malware detection described in Section 3.3, the methodology aimed
for malware classification introduced in Section 3.4, and the hybrid scenario in
which the proposed method can be used presented in Section 3.5, we can sum-
marize the key properties as follows:
• It provides protection against malicious infections, at low cost, in resource-
constrained environment by maximizing F-measure with respect to detec-
tion time and power consumption
• It is based on the observation of the dynamic aspects of the system behavior
and as such is able to detect previously unseen malware samples and is
more resistant against obfuscation than commonly used static methods
• It is adaptive and can be suited for a variety of resource-constrained de-
vices, since the number of observed features can be changed with respect
to the environment in which the system is used and the observed metric
can be optimized with the applications-specific conditions
• It is used at runtime, when it selects and monitors only the most indicative
features able to discriminate between malicious and benign behavior
• It uses customized detection algorithms of low complexity to perform on
device malware detection
• It is both effective and efficient and provides early detection of mobile mal-
ware
• It is able to detect both parts of the malicious applications executions and
the complete malicious applications
• It can distinguish between diverse malicious behavior of running applica-
tions
• It can be used as a standalone approach or in a combination with static
analysis, as a part of a hybrid approach
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• It is data-driven, where parameters are decided based on the experimen-
tal results based on the observation of the influence of behavior of both
malicious and benign applications on the system parameters
• It increases systems security and by early detection of attacks also increases
systems uptime thus contributing to the overall increase of systems depend-
ability
• It is demonstratable on the high-impact operating system such as Android
OS.
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Chapter 4
Setup for the Experiments
The approach we proposed and discussed in Chapter 3 can be applied to any
operating system. However, since such approach is the most suitable for the
battery-operated devices on one side, and on the other, according to Cisco 2014
Annual Security Report [2014], the vast majority of known mobile malware tar-
gets Android devices, and, there is large availability of malware samples for mo-
bile systems based on Android OS, we use both malicious and benign applica-
tions running on it and its emulation environment in our study. Additionally,
Android OS has by far the largest install base worldwide and provides develop-
ers and researchers with sufficient freedom to carry out the foreseen tasks. In the
remaining part of this chapter, we first discuss the dataset and the execution en-
vironment we used in order to test our approach. Later, we describe the features
that we collected and introduce the feature selection methods used in order to
reduce the number of monitored features and identify only the most indicative
ones for both malware detection and malware classification tasks. Finally, we
give details on the environment that we used for the power consumption eval-
uation of the developed detection methods and the environment we used for
development and testing of the proposed methodology.
4.1 Datasets
One important part of the proposed methodology is the selection of a suitable
dataset of representative applications to be executed. Namely, on one side it is
important to use malware samples originating from different malware families,
so that the diverse behavior of malware is covered to as large extent as possible,
and on the other a set of benign applications coming from various available cate-
gories. In order to ensure it, we used a dataset consisting of a variety of malware
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families with broad scope of behavior. Furthermore, it is also needed to set up
the execution environment to run malware samples, so that malicious behavior
is activated and with the possibility to execute large number of samples at the
same time, so that the obtained results have statistical significance. In order to
achieve these we used an emulated environment in which we set up an automatic
method for triggering different events while executing applications.
Since our goal is to discriminate between malware and benign applications,
we have taken into account also benign samples, covering a wide range of appli-
cation categories, and executing them in the same conditions used for malicious
applications.
The datasets that we use in the experiments consist of a mix of benign and
malicious applications, that we describe in the remaining of this section.
4.1.1 Benign applications collection
With the widespread presence of malware, greyware and madware, as intro-
duced in Section 2.1, some of it being hidden within the applications without
exposing its intents until certain conditions are met, it is difficult to guarantee
that the collected applications are absolutely benign. However, in order to be
more confident about it, we have selected to download all the applications from
the official Google Play Store [2015], where they are investigated by Google for
potential malicious content. Additionally, to further increase the probability of
having malware-free applications, the benign applications retrieved are among
the most frequently downloaded ones in their category, and they are further an-
alyzed with the Virus Total [n.d.] service, that runs 57 different antimalware
software on each submitted application and its output confirmed that the benign
applications did not contain any malware.
In order to cover a variety of benign behavior of Android applications, the
downloaded applications belong to a set of different categories, listed in Table
4.1.
4.1.2 Malicious applications collection
Up to date, two datasets with malicious applications for Android OS were re-
leased for the research community: Malware Genome, released by Zhou and
Jiang [2012] and Drebin dataset, made public by Arp, Spreitzenbarth, Huebner,
Gascon and Rieck [2014] and by Spreitzenbarth, Echtler, Schreck, Freling and
Hoffmann [2013]. We collected malicious applications from both of them and
we used them in the evaluation of our approach.
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Table 4.1. Considered categories for analyzed benign applications taken from
GooglePlay.
Books & Reference Lifestyle Business Live Wallpaper
Comics Media & Video Communication Medical
Education Music & Audio Finance News & Magazines
Games Personalization Health & Fitness Photography
Libraries & Demo Productivity Shopping Social
Sport Tools Travel & Local Transportation
Weather Widgets
Malware Genome dataset is released in year 2012 as a part of Malware Genome
project, with a goal to mitigate malware threats on Android mobile platform and
engage the research community to better understanding and defense. The au-
thors collected the dataset by crawling both manually and in the automated way
a variety of Android Markets. The dataset is composed of 1,260 Android malware
samples, that cover the variety of malicious behavior belonging to 49 different
malware families. The detailed analysis of this dataset, performed by Zhou and
Jiang [2012], showed that the released malware families cover a broad range
of existing malware behavior, including different installation methods (repack-
aging, update, drive-by download, standalone), activation mechanisms (Boot
Completed, Phone Events, SMS, CALL, USB, Battery, Package, Network, System
Events) and different malicious payloads (privilege escalation, remote control,
financial charges, and personal information stealing). According to the authors,
1,083 out of the considered applications (thus 86%) are repackaged versions
of legitimate applications with malicious payloads; one third of the applications
(36.7%) uses some root-level exploits to compromise the system; more than 90%
of the applications turn the compromised device into a botnet controlled through
network or short messages; among the considered families, 28 of them have
built-in capabilities to send messages to premium-rate numbers or to make calls
without users awareness; 27 families are harvesting information about users,
together with users accounts and users messages.
To foster research in Android malware detection and enable comparison of
performance of different approaches the authors of Drebin, released their dataset
too. This dataset, introduced and discussed by Arp, Spreitzenbarth, Huebner,
Gascon and Rieck [2014] and by Spreitzenbarth, Echtler, Schreck, Freling and
Hoffmann [2013] consists of 5,560 applications from 179 different malware fam-
ilies. The samples have been collected in the period of August 2010 to October
2012 and were made available by the MobileSandbox project, that is a web-based
tool that takes an Android application (apk-file) and analyzes it for malicious be-
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haviour. The tool is proposed and described by Spreitzenbarth, Echtler, Schreck,
Freling and Hoffmann [2013].
4.1.3 Dataset used in malware detection task
The experiments with the malware detection task were performed using Malware
Genome dataset and 950 benign applications coming from the Play Store, as
outlined in Table 4.2. Based on this dataset, we evaluated the detection accuracy
of the malicious records detection and malicious application detection systems
that we designed. Additionally, using it, we also experimented with the most
suitable sampling period.
Table 4.2. Malware detection dataset description
Category Number of families Number of Samples
Malware Applications 41 1120
Benign Applications – 950
4.1.4 Dataset used in malware classification task
For the malware classification task, the used malware and benign applications,
together with their number are shown in Table 4.3. The five Trojan families,
taken from Malware Genome and Drebin dataset, that were considered as a
proof-of-concept, are following:
• DroidKungFu: Once installed, Trojans in this family attempt to gain con-
trol of the system by using exploits that are stored in the malware pack-
age and encrypted with a key. DroidKungFu collects the following pieces
of information from the phone: International Mobile Equipment Identity
(IMEI), Mobile device model, network operator and type, OS APIs and type,
and information stored in phone and SD card memory.
• Fake Player: Trojans belonging to this family pretend to be a movie player,
but instead send SMS messages.
• Geinimi: Trojans belonging to this family send personal data (location
coordinates, device identifiers, the list of installed apps) to remote servers.
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• GinMaster: If triggered, Trojans in this family harvest confidential infor-
mation from devices without users knowledge nor consent. Phone identifi-
cation numbers (IMEI and IMSI, SIM number, telephone number), network
type, current version of applications, and serial number are stolen by this
malware in this family.
• Kmin: Trojans in this family collect user and device data (Device ID, Sub-
scriber ID, current time) and send it to a remote server.
Table 4.3. Malware Classification dataset description
Category Name Number of Samples
Malware
DroidKungFu 667
Fake Player 6
Geinimi 92
Ginger Master 339
Kmin 147
Benign Apps – 300
4.1.5 Dataset used in the evaluation of the hybrid method
Dataset used in the evaluation of the hybrid method contains 3,058 mobile ap-
plications: 2,386 Android benign applications downloaded from the Google Play
Store and 672 applications containing malware of type ransomware taken from
the freely available HelDroid dataset1, as outlined in Table 4.4. These malicious
samples appeared form December 2014 to June 2015. The list of malware fam-
ilies to which these samples belong, as introduced by Andronio et al. [2015],
follows:
• Malicious applications in the Locker family are able to block the screen of
an infected device and requests a ransom for unlocking the device. No files
are actually encrypted.
• The Koler payload is delivered with site redirection; once installed and run
the screen is taken over by the ransom browser page; pressing the Home
button or attempting to dismiss the page works for a very short time as the
page reappears when users attempt to open another application or within
a few seconds.
1http://ransom.mobi
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• Malware in the Svpeng family are based on an overlay attack: legitimate
applications launched by the user are overlayed with a fake window imi-
tating the legitimate applications and thus fooling the victim. Additionally,
users receive a message, which claims to have been sent by the FBI, ex-
plaining that it has been used to access child pornography sites and has
been locked until fine is paid via MoneyPak.
• Samples in the ScarePakage malware family masquerade as well-known
applications, such as Adobe Flash or antimalware applications; and, when
launched, they pretend to scan your phone. After completing the fake scan,
the device is locked and after a reboot a fake FBI message is shown. A ran-
som of several hundred dollars in a MoneyPak voucher is asked to bring
back the device to normal. The application does not need root permissions
in order to take over the phone, but it does need device administrator priv-
ileges.
• Malicious applications in the SimpleLocker family scan the SD card for im-
ages, documents and videos and encrypt them by using AES; a message
notifying the user and asking for a ransom is shown on the display. This
is the only family in our dataset that actually encrypts data on the device
and it was the first one discovered for Android.
Table 4.4. Hybrid approach dataset description
Category Number of families Number of Samples
Malicious Ransomware Applications 5 672
Benign Applications – 2386
For development and validation of the proposed approach, we have ana-
lyzed the collected data both by separating the acquired applications into a train-
ing, test and validation datasets and by using cross-validation on the complete
dataset.
4.2 Database creation
The database we create consists of the execution records of both malicious and
benign applications. Features of interest have been recorded by running the ap-
plications, one at a time, on the Android emulator and by using a script that
recorded their usage periodically; each application has been run for 10 minutes.
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Although it could be the case that a longer execution period would provide more
significant results, we believe that the duration we have chosen is a good trade-
off between time when most of the malware samples expose their malicious in-
tentions and duration of the overall experimentation. This claim is additionally
supported by the results on detection time discussed in Section 5.2.4.
In order to guarantee that the executed malicious samples did not cause any
external damage, we have used an emulated environment for the execution of
the applications. This was done for both benign and malicious applications in
order to have a database with consistent execution traces. The Android emulator
of choice in our case is the one included in the Android Software Development
Kit released by Android Open Source project [2015b] under number 20140702,
running Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich). Additional reason why an Android
emulator has been chosen instead of real devices is that this solution provides the
ability to run a large number of applications, making the obtained dataset more
significant. The Android OS has been each time re-initialized before running
each application. In this way, we were able to avoid possible interference from
previously run samples (e.g., changed settings, running processes, modifications
of the operating system files). In the Android 4.0 version that we use in order to
perform the experimental evaluation, the Android uses Dalvik Just in Time (JIT)
compiler, in order to have smaller footprint and use less space on the device,
that each time when the app is run, it dynamically translates a part of the Dalvik
bytecode (.dex) into native machine code.
The procedure of executing the applications has been automated by means of
a Linux shell script, which has been run on a Linux PC and made use of Android
Debug Bridge (adb) introduced by Android Open Source project [2015a], a com-
mand line tool that allows the PC to communicate with an emulator instance or
with an Android device. The Monkey application exerciser released by Android
Open Source project [2015c] has also been used in the script. The Monkey is a
command-line tool that can be run on any emulator instance or on a device; it
sends a pseudo-random stream of user events into the system, which acts as a
stress test on the application software.
In our script, Monkey has been used to activate different parts of the applica-
tions; adb has been used to monitor application features, as well as to install the
applications. In summary, the following actions have been performed for each
application:
• A clean installation of Android OS is performed on the emulator
• The application is installed by means of adb
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• The monitoring of dynamic features of interest is initialized
• The application is started and run for 10 minutes by using Monkey.
Due to the type of features considered, limited or no influence is expected from
the fact that the emulator is used instead of real devices.
The database contains the execution traces of the collected malicious and be-
nign applications and their influence on the observed dynamic parameters of the
system. In order to make the database as representative as possible we collected
and executed those malicious samples that are released publicly for research pur-
poses. Although we are aware that there is a variety of other malware samples
present on the market, due to the fact that they are not publicly released we could
not take them into account, which makes our collected database more suitable
for research rather than industrial purpose. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first database of this kind and we believe that it can be used in
order to facilitate the research in the area of dynamic malware detection methods
and their further adoption in real-time scenarios.
4.3 Collected features
We have collected dynamic features related to memory, CPU and network behav-
ior, and statistics on system calls as well as generated system calls of the observed
applications executions. The collected features together with categories they be-
long to, are listed in Table 4.5.
4.3.1 Memory and CPU related features
We have taken into account all the features related to memory and CPU that could
be accessed in Android OS from adb; in total, we have recorded 53 features.
Features are extracted and composed in execution records (i.e., feature vectors)
that represent the behavior of the system with a 2s sampling period.
In detail, we have extracted three CPU-related features related to single ap-
plications under analysis:
• Total: total percentage of CPU used
• User: percentage of CPU used by user
• Kernel: percentage of CPU used by kernel
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Memory related features are obtained by monitoring the following types of
memory consumption: (i) the Dalvik Virtual Machine; (ii) the native memory us-
age; (iii) the total memory usage. In particular, for each of these three categories,
we have extracted the following features:
• PSS: The total Proportional Set Size (PSS) is the RAM used by proces; it
indicates the overall memory weight of a process, which can be directly
compared with other processes and the total available RAM
• Shared: Shared Dirty is the amount of shared RAM that will be released
back to the system when the process is destroyed; Dirty RAM is represented
by pages that have been modified and must stay committed to RAM, since
there is no swap in Android OS
• Private: Private Dirty is the amount of RAM that will be released back to
the system when the process is destroyed
• Heap allocation: It represents the RAM actually allocated by Dalvik Virtual
Machine for the application under analysis
• Heap free: Represents the allocatable RAM by Dalvik Virtual Machine for
the application under analysis
All considered memory features are about single applications under analysis.
4.3.2 Network behavior related features
Network statistics have been obtained by logging all network traffic of the emu-
lator and by successively running the tcpstat tool introduced by Herman [2009],
set to consider 2s sampling period. The network features contain network statis-
tics at transport, link and Internet layer. The collected information about the
network traffic is grouped into the network features depicted in Table 4.5.
4.3.3 Observed system calls and features related to the statistics
of system calls
To collect system calls we used strace 2, a tool for tracing system calls. In par-
ticular, we used the command strace -p PID in order to hook the process cor-
responding to the application under analysis and intercept only its system calls.
2http://linux.die.net/man/1/strace
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Table 4.5. List of all the considered features; totals are related only to single
applications; unless differently specified, all numbers are related to the consid-
ered sample rate of 2s.
Category Feature Names
CPU
CPU Usage Total CPU Usage, User CPU Usage, Kernel CPU Usage
Virtual Memory Page Minor Faults, Page Major Faults
Memory
Native memory Native Pss, Native Shared Dirty, Native Private Dirty, Native Heap Size,
Native Heap Alloc, Native Heap Free
Dalvik memory Dalvik Pss, Dalvik Shared Dirty, Dalvik Private Dirty, Dalvik Heap Size,
Dalvik Heap Alloc, Dalvik Heap Free, Cursor Pss
Cursor memory Cursor Shared Dirty, Cursor Private Dirty
Android shared memory Ashmem Pss, Ashmem Shared Dirty, Ashmem Private Dirty
Memory-mapped native code .so mmap Pss, .so mmap Shared Dirty, .so mmap Private Dirty
Memory mapped Dalvik code .dex mmap Pss, .dex mmap Shared Dirty, .dex mmap Private Dirty
Memory-mapped fonts .ttf mmap Pss, .ttf mmap Shared Dirt[]y, .ttf mmap Private Dirty
Other memory-mapped files and
devices
.jar mmap Pss, .jar mmap Shared Dirty, .jar mmap Private Dirty, .apk
mmap Pss, .apk mmap Shared Dirty, .apk mmap Private Dirty, Other
mmap Pss, Other mmap Shared Dirty, Other mmap Private Dirty
Non-classified memory alloca-
tions
Unknown Pss, Unknown Shared Dirty, Unknown Private Dirty, Other dev
Pss, Other dev Shared Dirty, Other dev Private Dirty
Memory Totals TOTAL Pss, TOTAL Shared Dirty, TOTAL Private Dirty, TOTAL Heap Size,
TOTAL Heap Alloc, TOTAL Heap Free
Objects Views, ViewRootImpl, AppContexts, Activities, Assets, AssetManagers,
Local Binders, Proxy Binders, Death Recipients, OpenSSL Sockets
SQL heap, MEMORY_USED, PAGECACHE_OVERFLOW, MALLOC_SIZE
Network
Link layer networking Number of ARP packets, AVG. PKT Size bytes, bps, Number of ICMP
packets, Size in byte standard deviation
Internet layer networking Number of IPv4 packets, Network load over last minute, Maximum
packet size in bytes, Minimum packet size in bytes, Number of bytes,
Number of packets, Number of packets per second, Number of IPv6 pack-
ets
Transport layer networking Number of TCP packets, Number of UDP packets
System calls Number of Syscalls, No. of different syscalls, Average no. of calls per
syscall, No. of calls occurring once, No. of calls occurring multiple times
Apart from collecting system calls during the execution of the applications, we
have also taken into account, as possibly indicative features, following statistics
on collected system calls: number of system calls, number of different system
calls, average number of calls per system call, number of calls occurring once,
and number of calls occurring multiple times, as depicted in Figure 4.5.
4.4 Features Selection
Although, intuitively, the higher the number of features the better classification
results should be, in practice this is not always the case as it can happen that
irrelevant and redundant features confuse classifiers and decrease detection per-
formance. Due to this fact, we have performed feature selection as a separate
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step, in which we have evaluated the importance of all previously introduced col-
lected features. An extensive survey providing more insight about the usefulness
of feature selection methods and covering the state of the art in feature selection
is proposed by Liu and Yu [2005].
The main purpose of the feature selection step is to find the features subset
that represents the best the original set of features with respect to some prede-
fined criteria. The existing methods can be divided into filter, wrapper or hybrid.
Filter based feature selection models evaluate the importance of features inde-
pendently from any specific classifier, using criteria based on independent mea-
sures (i.e., information gain). Wrapper methods are focused on the selection of
the features subset that is the most representative for the selected classifier of
choice. Hybrid methods use combination of filter and wrapper approach.
In this thesis, we focus on the evaluation of the importance of features using
filter methods, and thus measure of the features importance independent from
the used set of classifier. The main motivation behind this choice is to keep the
proposed methodology modular, so that, in example, if we have to replace a clas-
sification module, we do not necessary have to replace the features monitoring
part at the same time.
In order to find which features contain the highest amount of information
about the behavior of the running applications, we have evaluated their impor-
tance from different perspectives, namely different independent measures. With
respect to this, we have taken into account features selection filter based methods
that observe usefulness of features based on statistical importance or information
gain measure or correlation measure between attributes. More precisely, we have
evaluated features usefulness based on the following techniques: Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA), Correlation Attribute Evaluator, CFS Subset Evaluator,
Gain Ratio Attribute Evaluator, Information Gain Attribute Evaluator, and OneR
Feature Evaluator.
Following is the short description of the feature selection algorithms that we
have used:
• PCA is a method that is able to identify how different variables work to-
gether to create dynamics of the system. Additionally, it can reduce the
dimensionality and decrease redundancy in the data, filter the noise, and
prepare the data for further analysis using other techniques, as stated by
Shlens [2005]. PCA method is already proven in the literature as a suc-
cessful method in the selection of indicative features for detection of PC
malware, as pointed out by Yen and Reiter [2008], by Vinod et al. [2012],
and by Nair et al. [2010].
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• Correlation Attribute Evaluator calculates the worth of an attribute by mea-
suring the correlation between it and the class. An attribute X is preferred
to another attribute Y if the correlation between attribute X and class C is
higher than the correlation between Y and C.
• CFS Subset Evaluator calculates the worth of a subset of attributes by con-
sidering the individual predictive ability of each feature along with the
degree of redundancy between them. Subsets of features that are highly
correlated with the class while having low intercorrelation are preferred,
as discussed by Hall [1998].
• Information Gain Attribute Evaluator calculates the worth of an attribute
by measuring the information gain with respect to the class. The informa-
tion gain from an attribute X is defined as the difference between the prior
uncertainty and expected posterior uncertainty using X. In this context, at-
tribute X is preferred to attribute Y if the information gain from X is greater
than that from Y.
• Gain Ratio Attribute Evaluator calculates the worth of an attribute by mea-
suring its gain ratio with respect to the class. The information gain ratio is
a ratio of information gain to the intrinsic information. It is used to reduce
a bias towards multi-valued attributes by taking the number and size of
branches into account when choosing an attribute 3.
• OneR Feature Evaluation calculates the worth of an attribute by using the
OneR classifier, which uses the minimum-error attribute for prediction. Al-
though simple, this method is shown to perform well in many practical
scenarios, as pointed out by Holte [1993].
For the mentioned feature selection methods their implementations in the
Weka tool, proposed by Hall et al. [2009], has been used. Weka is a data mining
tool based on Java that we connected with our experimental environment and
that we used due to already proven bug-free algorithms implementations.
4.5 Power Consumption Measurement
We implemented the detection system we propose as an Android application, that
we have later used to measure its power consumption. The developed application
3http://www.ke.tu-darmstadt.de/lehre/archiv/ws0809/mldm/dt.pdf
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was tested on a Google Nexus 5 mobile phone 4. The CPU power consumption
was evaluated by using PowerTutor, an application that displays the power con-
sumed by major system components such as CPU, network interface, display, and
GPS receiver introduced by Zhang et al. [2010]. PowerTutor’s power model was
originally built on HTC G1, HTC G2 and Nexus One. On other Google phones,
like ours, it provides rough estimation of the power. Although power estimation
is approximate, we still find it suitable for relative comparison between power
consumption of our detection system when different sampling periods are em-
ployed, the main purpose we use it for. Namely, the way we collect consumed
battery power measures is that we run on the phone the implemented application
and we observe the consumed power while changing sample rates of interest (2s,
4s, 6s, 8s, 10s, 12s, and 16s). For each of the sampling periods we observe the
battery power consumption for one hour and we repeat the same experiment
three times, after which we average the reported battery power consumption,
and we use it for the evaluation of the power consumption of the observed de-
tection solution. Between each of the measures the phone is restarted, in order to
guarantee that there is no dependence between current and previously executed
experiment. Since from the point of view of the developed detection system the
complexity remains the same in case of malicious or benign executions, in order
not to cause any damage to the used devices, the power consumption of the de-
veloped method was evaluated while only benign applications were running on
it.
4.6 Development Environment
In addition to the automated process of the applications executions, introduced
in Section 4.2, we have also automated the process of features selection and de-
tection algorithms training. The main development environment used for these
tasks is Java based Intellij Idea 5, Java integrated development environment, that
is connected with Weka tool, from which different feature selection methods and
different machine learning classifiers were used. The proposed method is im-
plemented as an application for Android OS, using Android Studio 6, that is the
official integrated development environment for Android.
4https://www.androidcentral.com/nexus-5-specs
5https://www.jetbrains.com/idea/
6https://developer.android.com/studio/index.html
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Chapter 5
Experiments and Results
With increased use of mobile devices also the interest of attackers to abuse them
is increasing, which further results in the increased number of malware samples
and malware families, that attackers develop in order to carry out their malicious
intents. In Section 2 we investigate existing mobile threats and proposed detec-
tion solutions. Our investigation has shown that most of the currently proposed
methods are either too complex to be employed on battery-operated mobile de-
vices or provide insufficient detection accuracy against a wide range of malware
and against unknown malicious samples. Additionally, most of the current so-
lutions are not able to detect parts of malicious applications executions nor to
identify malicious families being executed. Finally, they frequently do not take
into account detection time, so it is not clear if the system would be able to re-
spond in time and actually protect the user against malicious infection. Due to
this, we focused our research efforts on runtime detection of malicious parts of
applications, complete malicious applications, and discrimination between dif-
ferent malware families, thus malware classification, while having in mind the
resource-constrained environment in which these algorithms have to be used
and while being focused on early detection of the malicious infections. In the
remaining part of this chapter we discuss results we obtained performing this
investigation.
One of the most important parts of the proposed methodology, introduced in
Section 3, is the identification of the most indicative features to be monitored
at runtime in order to detect and identify presence of malware. The features
that we identified for this task we discuss in Section 5.1. Once the most indica-
tive features are identified, a detection algorithm suitable for limited resources
of mobile devices has to be used. Since our goal was to detect both parts of
malicious application and complete applications, we developed two detection
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methods: one for malicious records detection and the other for malicious ap-
plications detection. In addition to being able to understand which parts of the
running applications are malicious, in this way we can also customize our de-
tection system with respect to detection time and detection accuracy. Results we
obtained in detection of the most indicative features for the discrimination be-
tween malware and benign applications are discussed in Section 5.2.1, followed
by the results in the detection of malicious execution records that are presented
in Section 5.2.2. Detection results on complete applications are given in Sec-
tion 5.2.4. In Section 5.2.5we investigate the importance of the sampling period
of the monitoring infrastructure for the efficient malware detection, and discuss
dependencies between detection accuracy, detection time and consumed power
with respect to it. Apart from designing a system being able to discriminate be-
tween malicious executions records and applications, we also propose a solution
for detection of groups of malicious executions (sub-traces). The results we ob-
tained in this domain are given in Section 5.2.3. Finally, after identifying that
most of the current detection solutions are not able to provide more informa-
tion about the nature of the executed program than it is malware or benign, we
investigated and provided initial results in detection of parts of executions that
are belonging to mobile malware families. These results are presented in Sec-
tion 5.3. Additionally, in Section 5.3 we discuss the proposed unified malware
detection and malware classification system, that performs malware detection on
device and, in case malware is being detected, sends the most indicative features
for the malware classification task into a network for the further analysis and
the decision on countermeasures. The methods we propose for both malware
detection and malware classification tasks are standalone, dynamic methods, in-
tended for the protection of malware that appears at runtime. Apart from their
usage as a standalone method, we also investigate the performance of a hybrid
approach, combined static and dynamic detection, and in Section 5.4 we discuss
the obtained results.
The experiments we performed in this work and the results we report in this
chapter are with a set of mobile devices running applications on Android OS.
However, due to the simplicity of monitoring and the low-complexity of algo-
rithms used to detect malware, we are confident that our approach can also be
used in majority of other IoT devices.
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5.1 Identification of the most indicative features for ef-
ficient and effective malware detection and malware
classification
In order to select the most indicative features that can be used to discriminate
malicious from benign behavior, and to discriminate between different types of
malicious behaviors, we investigated the importance of memory and CPU related
features. On one side, these features are easily accessible on a phone which is in
line with our goal to have a monitoring infrastructure of low complexity. On the
other side they reflect well the behavior of the system.
We have executed malware samples using the experimental setup described in
Chapter 4 and we have observed their influence on all memory and CPU features
representing phone state that we could collect (53 features in sum, 48 for mem-
ory occupation and 5 for CPU usage, described in Section 4.3). We have analyzed
the collected execution traces by using PCA, introduced in Section 4.4. Results
have been obtained by analyzing following 25 malware families, taken from the
Malware Genome project described in Section 4.1.2 and released by Zhou and
Jiang [2012]: AnserverBot, Asroot, BaseBridge, BeanBot, CoinPirate, CruseWin,
DroidDream, DroidDreamLight, DroidKungFu1, DroidKungFu2, DroidKungFu3,
Fake Player, Geinimi, Ginger Master, Gold Dream, Hippo SMS, jSMSHider, KMin,
Pjapps, Plankton, Rogue Lemon, Rogue SPPush, SndApps, zHash, and Zsone;
since these families cover broad behavior of malware.
After applying PCA on the features collected during the execution of mobile
malware samples, we ranked their importance within the families used. Then,
we calculated the occurrence of each of the analyzed features among the top
ranked 5 and top ranked 15 features. Top 5 and top 15 features are chosen to be
presented, because it is a number of features that is compatible with the limited
resources of a smartphone, both for monitoring and detection.
Information about the number of occurrences of features among top 5 the
highest ranked is given in Figure 5.1 and the information about number of oc-
currences of features among top 15 the highest ranked is given in Figure 5.2.
Although 53 features were used for the analyses, not all of them appeared as
promising candidates for detection. Namely, only 15 of them appear among top
5 of the most indicative features (as it can be seen in Figure 5.1) and only 25 of
them appear among top 15 indicative features (as it can be seen in Figure 5.2).
While Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate which features are the most frequent,
further insights into the importance of features can be observed by looking at
their average position within rankings. This ranking is depicted in Figures 5.3
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Figure 5.1. Number of occurrences of memory and CPU usage related features
among the top 5 most indicative ones
and 5.4 that represent the average position of the 15 features shown in Figure
5.1 and 25 features shown in Figure 5.2. Together with average ranking, also
the number of occurrences of the features is included in the figures.
The figure shows that there are some features, such as Page Major Faults and
Cursor PSS, that, besides appearing very frequently, are also often ranked high.
Conversely, features that are not appearing frequently, such as CPU Kernel and
Dalvik Private Dirty, are ranked low.
Based on our studies we can observe the following: some features are not
appearing among the indicative ones, thus being irrelevant for further investi-
gation; some features appear as indicative for almost each of the investigated
malware families; and some features appear to be indicative only for some of the
analyzed malware families.
Features indicative overall are features that appear as indicative in almost all
investigated malware families, having at the same time high average rank. We
believe these features are good candidates for further investigation towards iden-
tification of malware in general, thus malware detection. According to Figure 5.3
such features are Page Major Faults, Dalvik Heap Free, Ashmem PSS and Cursor
PSS. According to Figure 5.4 representative features are Native Shared Dirty, Na-
tive Private Dirty, Dalvik Private Dirty, Dalvik Heap Size, Dalvik Heap Alloc, and
Dalvik Heap Free. These features represent different aspects of programs behav-
ior. Page Major Faults, appear when the page is not loaded in memory at the
time the fault is generated. Dalvik Heap Free is the free RAM that can be used
by Dalvik allocations in the applications. Proportional Set Size (PSS) is the mea-
surement of the applications usage that takes into account sharing pages across
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Figure 5.2. Number of occurrences of memory and CPU usage related features
among the top 15 most indicative ones
Figure 5.3. Average ranking of the features that appear among the top 5 the
most indicative ones. Blue color depicts the average rank of the observed
features, while red color depicts its number of occurrences.
processes. Ashmem PSS and Ashmem Shared Dirty are describing Android shared
dynamic RAM usage across processes using explicitly allocated shared memory
regions.
Features indicative for specific malware families are features that appear rarely
as the most indicative, but when they appear they have high average rank. We
believe that these features are good candidates for further investigation towards
identification of specific malware families, thus malware classification. Accord-
ing to Figure 5.3 such features are Dalvik Heap Size and Page Minor Faults. Ac-
cording to Figure 5.4 relevant features are Cursor PSS and Cursor Private Dirty.
More in detail, Page Minor Faults appear when the page is loaded into memory
at the time the fault is generated, but it is not yet marked in the memory man-
agement unit as being loaded into memory. This could happen if the memory is
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Figure 5.4. Average ranking of the features that appear among the top 15
the most indicative ones. Blue color depicts the average rank of the observed
features, while red color depicts its number of occurrences.
shared by different processes and the page is already brought into memory for
other processes. Dalvik Heap Size is the RAM used by Dalvik allocations in the
applications.
5.2 Malware Detection
Since malware detection is one of the main goals of the proposed methodology, in
this section we outline the results we obtained in this domain, the most indicative
features for malware detection task, obtained detection accuracy in detection of
malicious records, malicious groups of records and malicious application. Also,
since one of the main design principles of the method that we propose is to take
into account power consumption and detection time in addition to the detection
accuracy, in this section we also discuss the results obtained while designing
such a detection system, dependencies between the three requirements taken
into account and the obtained optimized solutions.
5.2.1 Identification of the most indicative features for malware de-
tection
After preliminary analysis of indicative features characterized by PCA, described
in Section 5.1, further investigation of memory features importance for malware
detection task was performed using other feature selection techniques discussed
in Section 4.4 and the dataset discussed in Section 4.1.3. The first 15 highest
ranked features for the used feature selection methods are shown in Table 5.1.
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We may notice that different ranking methods provide different results; how-
ever, a number of features related to memory mapping, such as .ttf mmap PSS
and .so mmap PSS, are among the highest ranked ones in most methods. In Table
5.1 for CFS Subset Evaluator only seven features are listed, without any ranking.
This is due to the fact that CFS does not evaluate single features but, instead,
subsets of features, calculating their usefulness with respect to the other subsets.
Table 5.1. Top 15 features ranked by different feature selection algorithms.
Correlation Attribute Evaluator CFS Subset Evaluator Gain Ratio Attribute Evaluator
Ranking Feature Feature Ranking Feature
0.49 .ttf mmap PSS .so mmap Shared Dirty 0.12 .jar mmap PSS
0.46 .so mmap PSS .jar mmap PSS 0.06 .dex mmap Private Dirty
0.43 .dex mmap PSS .ttf mmap PSS 0.05 Other dev Private Dirty
0.39 TOTAL PSS .dex mmap PSS 0.04 .dex mmap PSS
0.38 .so mmap Shared Dirty .dex mmap Private Dirty 0.04 .ttf mmap PSS
0.36 TOTAL Private Dirty Other mmap Private Dirty 0.04 .so mmap Shared Dirty
0.36 .jar mmap PSS CPU Total 0.03 .so mmap PSS
0.33 Unknown Private Dirty 0.03 .so mmap Private Dirty
0.33 Unknown PSS 0.03 Other mmap Private Dirty
0.31 CPU User 0.03 .dex mmap Shared Dirty
0.30 CPU Total 0.03 Unknown PSS
0.30 TOTAL Heap Size 0.03 Native Heap Size
0.29 TOTAL Heap Alloc 0.03 Unknown Private Dirty
0.27 Other mmap PSS 0.03 Other mmap Shared Dirty
0.26 Native Heap Alloc 0.02 TOTAL PSS
Information Gain Attribute Evaluator OneR Attribute Evaluator
Ranking Feature Ranking Feature
0.28 .dex mmap PSS 79.99 .ttf mmap PSS
0.27 .ttf mmap PSS 79.64 .dex mmap PSS
0.25 Unknown PSS 78.92 Unknown PSS
0.25 .so mmap PSS 78.51 .so mmap PSS
0.23 Native Heap Size 76.24 TOTAL Heap Size
0.23 TOTAL Heap Size 76.19 Native Heap Size
0.21 Unknown Private Dirty 75.87 Unknown Private Dirty
0.21 .so mmap Private Dirty 75.44 .so mmap Private Dirty
0.17 .so mmap Shared Dirty 73.25 .so mmap Shared Dirty
0.17 Ashmed PSS 71.26 Native PSS
0.15 Other mmap PSS 71.21 Other mmap PSS
0.15 TOTAL PSS 71.17 Ashmed PSS
0.14 minor faults 70.75 minor faults
0.13 Native PSS 69.78 TOTAL PSS
0.13 TOTAL Private Dirty 69.49 .apk mmap PSS
It is our observation that the behavior of memory mapping is very important
in the discrimination between malicious and benign program executions. In fact,
as it can be also seen in Table 5.1, all of the five applied feature selection methods
list the importance of mmap related features very high in the ranking. In par-
ticular, in case of CFS Subset Evaluator that in our scenario performs the best,
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out of seven features selected as the most indicative, six are related to memory
and more precisely to memory mapping aspects. Related to this, we can further
observe that both shared and private memory aspects play significant role in the
discrimination of malware and benign software, so as Dalvik executable files,
true type fonts and Java archive related aspects. Finally, what the dynamic pa-
rameter that also influences the detection results is the CPU total consumption
of the applications under analysis.
5.2.2 Runtime Detection of Malicious Records
As we can observe from Table 5.1 different feature selection methods identify
different features as the most indicative. In order to validate the effectiveness
of the identified indicative features in detection of malicious execution records
and maximize the F-Measure, we have used the three detection algorithms, intro-
duced in 3.3.1 having different approach to detection: NB, LR, and J48 Decision
Tree.
The validation of the classification is done by using ten-fold cross validation,
that is widely used model validation technique that can estimate how accurately
observed model will perform in practice, as pointed out by Kohavi [1995]. In
case of ten-fold cross validation, the dataset is divided into ten parts, where at
each round, one part, consisting of nine folds, is considered as a training set and
the remaining part is used as a test set. This procedure is repeated ten times, each
time using a different training and a test set, and after ten rounds the average
detection performance is reported (precision, recall and F-measure).
In case of NB and LR we have evaluated the results of the classifiers both
considering all the available features and by considering only the highest ranked
ones for each feature selection method. We have repeated this procedure for all
five feature selection methods. More in detail, CFS Subset Evaluator is applied by
using Greedy forward search through the space of attribute subsets. Correlation
Attribute Evaluator, Gain Ratio Attribute Evaluator, Information Gain Attribute
Evaluator, and OneR Attribute Evaluator are used together with Ranker method
that ranks attributes by their individual performance. For J48 Decision Tree, we
have trained the model by changing the maximum number of instances that a
node can have and by observing its quality of detection (F-measure). The number
of instances is important in order to avoid over-fitting, a situation in which the
decision tree consists of many nodes that are very well fitted for the training
set, but do not perform well on a test set and unseen data. In J48 Decision
Tree, the maximum number of instances in the tree can be set, but indicative
features are selected by the algorithm itself and cannot be set externally. NB
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has been set assuming normality and modelling each conditional distribution
with a single Gaussian; LR has been used with ridge estimator, since it has been
shown by Le Cessie and Van Houwelingen [1992] that it can improve attribute
estimation and decrease the error made in further predictions. J48 has been
used with pruning, setting the confidence factor used for pruning to 0.25 and
the minimum number of instances per leaf to 5000; these values represent a
trade-off between number of instances in the dataset, speed of execution and
the quality of classification.
Table 5.2 summarizes the results obtained with these three classifiers. The
initial model includes all the 53 features available. The second model, instead,
is the one providing maximum F-measure; the last one provides the best ratio
between F-measure and the number of features considered.
Table 5.2. Performance of the classifiers when different number of features is
considered.
Model
Initial Max. F-
measure
Optimized
NB
Precision 0.79 0.84 0.84
Recall 0.76 0.83 0.83
F-measure 0.77 0.83 0.83
No. of features 53 7 7
LR
Precision 0.84 0.86 0.84
Recall 0.84 0.86 0.84
F-measure 0.83 0.86 0.84
No. of features 53 38 7
J48 Decision Tree
Precision – – 0.83
Recall – 0.83
F-measure – – 0.82
No. of features – – 6
In case of NB, with the dataset containing all 53 features, an F-measure of
0.77 is obtained. After taking into account rankings of the features for all five
feature selection methods, we identified an optimized set of features, both with
respect to their number and to F-measure, as the one computed with the CFS
Subset Evaluator. As it can be seen from Table 5.2, the obtained F-measure in
this case is 0.83, with a set of seven features.
In case of LR, using all features, we obtained F-measure of 0.83. However,
decreasing the number of features and observing system performance, we ob-
tained an increased F-measure of 0.86, obtained by using Correlation Attributes
with rankings higher than 0.03 (38 features). The optimal model with respect
to both number of features and quality of detection is again obtained by using
features selected by CFS Subset Evaluator. This model has an F-measure of 0.84.
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For what concerns J48, the obtained model, that uses six features, has an
F-measure of 0.82. The decision tree, with the selected features thereby used, is
shown in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5. Optimized J48 Decision Tree; malicious and benign traces are
labelled with 0 and 1, respectively.
In summary, features that are the most indicative for LR and NB classifiers are
the seven listed in the CFS Subset Evaluator column of Table 5.1; for J48 Decision
Tree, the six most indicative features are listed in Figure 5.5. Out of seven the
most indicative features six are related to the memory consumption usage of the
observed application and different aspects of memory mapping and one to their
CPU consumption. These features are described in Table 5.3.
In summary, the best detection performance with respect to F-measure, so as
with respect to the ratio between F-measure and the number of features consid-
ered, is achieved by the LR algorithm. The best F-measure is obtained by consid-
ering 38 highest ranked features provided by the Correlation Attribute Evaluator;
the optimized set of only 7 features is obtained by considering the CFS Subset
Evaluator. Also the other two detection algorithms considered, namely NB and
J48 Decision Tree, perform well, showing similarly good detection performance.
We have shown that in case of LR and NB, detection performance, measured
with precision, recall, and F-measure, and presented in Table 5.2 is improved,
even if the number of features is decreased from 53 to 7. Reducing the number
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Table 5.3. Brief description of the most indicative features Google Inc. [2015].
Category Feature Name Feature Description
Memory mapped
native code
.so mmap Shared Dirty Shared memory, in the Dirty state, being used for
mapped native code. The Dirty state is due to fix-ups to
the native code when it is loaded into its final address
Memory-
mapped Dalvik
code
.dex mmap PSS Memory usage for Dalvik code, including pages shared
among processes
.dex mmap Private Dirty Private memory, in the Dirty state, being used for
Dalvik code. The Dirty state is due to fix-ups to the
native code when it is loaded into its final address
Memory-mapped
fonts
.ttf mmap PSS Memory usage for true type fonts, including pages
shared among processes
CPU usage CPU Total Total (User + System) CPU usage by the considered
application
Other memory-
mapped files and
devices
Other mmap Private Dirty Private memory used by unclassified contents that is
in the dirty state
.jar mmap PSS Memory usage for Java archives, including pages
shared among processes
of features without reducing performance of the system is in line with our inten-
tion to design effective, while at the same time efficient, mobile detection system.
We have observed that malicious samples consume less memory and CPU com-
pared to the benign ones. This can be seen looking into values of features of J48
Decision Tree presented in Figure 5.5. The reason for this could be that malicious
applications perform only a limited activity, connected to their malicious intent,
rather than the legitimate actions for which they were installed by the user.
From the results of our experiments, we can conclude that CPU and mem-
ory features contain useful information for discriminating between the execution
traces related to malicious or benign applications. Additionally, good detection
performance can be obtained while using algorithms of low complexity, suitable
for battery-operated mobile devices.
5.2.3 Detection of Malicious Sub-traces
In order to detect malicious sub-traces, we use the approach proposed in Section
3.3.3, and take into account dynamic features related to memory, CPU, network
behavior, as well as corresponding system calls.
We focus on traces in which the period of observations is one observation
every 2 s: the number of system calls generated during the corresponding time
frame is in the order of some hundreds. The clustering step is performed us-
ing the KMeans++ algorithm discussed by Arthur and Vassilvitskii [2007] that
partitions the observations into k clusters such that each observation belongs to
the cluster with the nearest mean that is used as a prototype of the cluster. For
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each cluster, a classifier is built using the method proposed by Canfora, Medvet,
Mercaldo and Visaggio [2015], based on sequences of system calls and RF clas-
sification, due to its reported high detection performance tested on a significant
portion of existing malware.
The considered features related to memory and CPU information are ex-
plained in 4.3. The set of system calls considered in this work is based on the
one successfully used by Canfora, Medvet, Mercaldo and Visaggio [2015] and it
is composed of following system calls: msgget, getpid, ioctl, recv, semget,
getuid32, mprotect, SYS_224, read, syscall_983042, write, gettimeofday,
writev, sigprocmask, mmap2, munmap, close, lseek, brk, pread, fstat64, open,
dup, fcntl64, stat64, getdents64, access, clone, semop, getpriority, fsync,
nanosleep, _llseek, unlink, lstat64, pwrite, chmod, rename, sched_yield,
pivot_root, mkdir, ipc_subcall, getsockopt, getcwd, pipe, sched_getsched,
sched_getparam, socket, uname, getgid32, getegid32, geteuid32, ftruncate,
syscall_317, select, rmdir, connect, bind, flock, setsockopt, getsockname,
kill, fork.
The experiments we have performed are taking into account different dis-
tance metrics for clustering stage, different number of clusters and different num-
ber of trees for classification stage with RF. We have experimented with number
of clusters 3, 5, and 7 and number of trees ranging from small (5 trees) to high
(50 trees). Concerning the time interval T which defines the lasting of a sub-
trace under analysis, we used the interval of T = 40s, which corresponds to 20
observations for each sub-trace, since it represents in our opinion a good trade-off
between time in which malware can expose its malicious intents (if the interval
is too long the malicious behavior could spread) and false positive rate (if the
interval is too small could create too many false positives).
We took into account following distance metrics for KMeans++ clustering:
• Euclidean distance is the most commonly used distance metric that repre-
sents straight-line distance between two points in an Euclidean space; the
distance between two points ~x and ~y is given by d(~x , ~y) =
Æ∑
i(x i − yi)2.
• Canberra distance has already been successfully used for intrusion detec-
tion, as discussed by Emran and Ye [2002]; it is given by d(~x , ~y) =
∑
i
|x i−yi ||x i |+|yi | .
• Chebyshev distance between two vectors is the largest of their differences
along any coordinate dimension; it is given by d(~x , ~y) = maxi |x i − yi|.
We have used 1,709 benign and 1,523 malicious applications for training and
testing, respectively. The evaluation has been performed by using 3 fold cross
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validation; in each round, sub-traces belonging to 1,000 benign and 1,000 mali-
cious applications have been used as a training set; the remaining ones are used
as a test set. This implies that testing is always performed on applications that
are previously unseen by the detection system. Detection accuracy is obtained
by averaging the results obtained in the three rounds.
The obtained results in term of sub-trace classification accuracy are shown in
Table 5.4.
Table 5.4. Sub-trace accuracy.
Observation
Distance No of clusters No of trees FPR FNR Acc.
Euclidean 3 5 0.12 0.61 0.63
Euclidean 3 50 0.33 0.44 0.61
Euclidean 5 5 0.14 0.53 0.66
Euclidean 5 50 0.17 0.51 0.66
Euclidean 7 5 0.14 0.58 0.64
Euclidean 7 50 0.28 0.39 0.67
Canberra 3 5 0.20 0.54 0.63
Canberra 3 50 0.60 0.23 0.58
Canberra 5 5 0.24 0.46 0.65
Canberra 5 50 0.19 0.49 0.66
Canberra 7 5 0.42 0.28 0.65
Canberra 7 50 0.54 0.16 0.65
Chebyshev 3 5 0.07 0.78 0.58
Chebyshev 3 50 0.07 0.70 0.62
Chebyshev 5 5 0.43 0.34 0.62
Chebyshev 5 50 0.49 0.29 0.61
Chebyshev 7 5 0.54 0.28 0.59
Chebyshev 7 50 0.31 0.35 0.67
From these results we can draw a set of conclusions. First, increasing the
number of trees in RF classifier, does not necessary increase detection perfor-
mance. This is promising because it means that the method can be applied
without need for algorithms of high complexity. Additional conclusion is that
increasing the number of clusters does increase detection performance. In our
opinion this is the case because the higher number of clusters is able to preserve
better the diverse behavior of malware. Furthermore, there is no dominantly
better distance, although the Euclidean one provides higher accuracy also when
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smaller numbers of clusters are considered. The highest accuracy of detection
being 0.67 is achieved with both Euclidean and Chebyshev distance with 7 clus-
ters and 50 trees. While this number is not great in absolute, we find it useful to
perform an initial marking of the potentially malicious sub-traces, that can then
be further investigated in more detail.
5.2.4 Malicious applications detection
As introduced in Section 3.3.2, the classification algorithm of choice has to be
compatible with the limited resources of mobile devices. Based on the results
we obtained in the malicious records detection from the Table 5.2 and based
on their complexity, we have adopted LR as our execution records classification
algorithm. However, since our detection system is modular, any other technique
or method, with satisfying detection performance and low complexity, could be
used in this case.
In order to validate the approach proposed in Section 3.3.2, we divided the
collected execution traces of the dataset into a training, a testing, and a valida-
tion set, consisting of 1,298 (727 malware, 571 benign), 579 (304 malware, 275
benign), and 183 samples (89 malware, 94 benign), respectively. The samples
in the testing and validation set contain malware samples belonging to the same
malware families as in the training set, but the samples themselves are different
(previously unseen by the detection system in the training procedure). Motiva-
tion for such an approach is that most of existing new malware samples on the
market are actually repackaged ones coming from previously existing malware
families, as also state by Zhou and Jiang [2012].
The algorithm parameters that we use for malicious applications classification
have been chosen experimentally by considering the test dataset. Parameters
taken into account are: the sliding window length, the threshold on the number
of records classified as malware in the window, and the number of disjointed
sliding windows that need to be marked as malware.
Due to the fact that these parameters have impact on final classification re-
sults, different values have been explored in two phases: a coarse-grain explo-
ration, used to determine the most promising values for the parameters, and a
fine-grain exploration, used to explore the neighborhood of the most promising
values determined in the first phase. The values considered in the two explo-
ration phases are shown in Table 5.5. The exact values depicted in Table 5.5
are related to the length of execution of the observed malicious and benign ap-
plications, that in our experiments was 10 minutes, as previously described in
Section 4.2. The main motivation behind the introduction of such parameters in
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the development of detection system was to investigate what is the best way to
capture the malicious behavior at runtime, if it is better to look at long patterns
that appear rarely (i.e., longer window length and lower number of checks),
short patterns that appear frequently (i.e., shorter window length and higher
number of checks), or something in between that reflects the best the intentions
of the running programs. Formally optimizing the values of the window length,
threshold and the number of checks is an open problem and requires a separate
treatment. In this work we took an experimental approach. In the observed sce-
nario, larger values for the sliding window length parameter are possible, but,
the larger the window, the longer the time needed to detect malware, especially
considering that multiple windows should be identified as malicious for classify-
ing an application as malware. Designing a detection system in this way allows
us to have a direct impact on detection accuracy and detection time of the sys-
tem, and to be able to customize it for a specific application scenarios if needed.
Execution records are available, as previously mentioned, with a periodicity of
two seconds.
The validation of the classification is first performed by using ten-fold cross
validation, and then, by separating the dataset into training, testing, and valida-
tion sets.
Table 5.5. Algorithm parameters used in the two phases of the exploration.
Parameter Coarse-grain explo-
ration
Fine-grain exploration
Sliding window
length
5, 10 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20
Threshold (%) 60, 70, 80, 90 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95
Checks (no.) 1, 2, 5, 7, 10 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
The analysis was done by considering both the malicious records classifica-
tion obtained with the Initial set of features (all considered 53 features) and the
one obtained with the Optimized set (features selected as the most indicative
for malicious records detection that are described in Table 5.3). Three different
metrics have been used for choosing the best set of parameters:
• highest F-measure
• best malware detection rate, with false positive rate below 30%
• lowest false positive rate with malware detection rate greater than 70%.
In the coarse-grain exploration phase, all the combinations of the parameters
shown in the leftmost part of Table 5.5 have been considered. In Table 5.6 the
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values that provide best results in this exploration phase are shown; the optimal
values differ for the different sets of features as well as for the different metrics
considered.
Table 5.6. Best malicious applications detection results obtained in the coarse-
grain exploration of detection algorithm’s parameters.
Feature set Metric Window
length,
Threshold,
Checks
Malware
detected
%
False pos-
itives %
F-measure
Initial
Highest F-measure 5, 60, 7 95.7 31.6 0.85
Best malware detection 5, 60, 10 92.1 27.3 0.85
Lowest false positive 10, 70, 10 71.4 17.7 0.76
Optimized
Highest F-measure 10, 90, 7 90.1 18.2 0.87
Best malware detection 10, 60, 7 95.7 29.1 0.86
Lowest false positive 10, 90, 10 72.4 9.8 0.80
Based on the results of the coarse-grain exploration, we defined new ranges of
values for the fine-grain exploration; the values considered in this phase are listed
in rightmost part of Table 5.5. The results obtained by using these parameters
are shown in Table 5.7. In some cases, similar results, in terms of F-measure
and true/false positive, have been obtained with different sets of parameters
with very similar values. In these cases, we have chosen the set of parameters
with the smallest window length, due to the associated shorter detection time.
Results obtained from the fine-grain exploration show slight improvements in
the considered metrics. With the optimized model, the detection rate and the
false positive rate are equal to 92.1% and 19.3%, respectively. On the average,
malware is detected after 81 execution records that, with the 2s sampling period
for monitoring infrastructure that we used in our experiments, corresponds to 2
minutes and 42 seconds from the beginning of the execution of each sample.
As far as algorithm parameters are concerned (sliding window length, thresh-
old, and number of checks), we can observe that a higher detection rate is ob-
tained by using medium-size windows with a low threshold and a relatively low
number of checks. Conversely, to minimize false positives, larger windows with
high thresholds should be preferred. The best F-measure is achieved by consid-
ering small windows with a not-too-high threshold, but with a high number of
checks.
Validation of the detection system has been performed by using execution
traces generated from previously unseen applications (i.e., malicious and benign
applications that have been used neither during training nor testing). Algorithm
parameters considered during validation are the ones that have been identified
as the best during the fine-grain exploration phase.
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Table 5.7. Best malicious applications detection results obtained in the fine-
grain exploration of detection algorithm’s parameters.
Feature set Metric Window
length,
Threshold,
Checks
Malware
detected
%
False pos-
itives %
F-measure
Initial
Highest F-measure 3, 80, 11 96.0 31.3 0.86
Best malware detection 5, 60, 9 93.7 28.7 0.85
Lowest false positive 15, 95, 5 72.0 14.5 0.78
Optimized
Highest F-measure 5, 85, 15 92.1 19.3 0.88
Best malware detection 10, 60, 7 95.7 29.1 0.86
Lowest false positive 20, 90, 5 71.4 9.4 0.79
Results of validation are shown in Table 5.8. As we can see in this scenario,
on the previously unseen samples the obtained higest F-measure is of 0.85, where
85.5% of malware is correctly identified as such with 17.2% false positive rate.
Having in mind the low number of features in the Optimized set (seven), so as
the fact that the samples considered have never been seen by the classifier during
training and testing, we can observe that validation shows satisfactory detection
performance.
Table 5.8. Best malicious applications detection results attained on the vali-
dation dataset with the parameters obtained from fine-grain exploration.
Feature set Metric Window
length,
Threshold,
Checks
Malware
detected
%
False pos-
itives %
F-measure
Initial
Highest F-measure 3, 80, 11 92.1 24.5 0.84
Best malware detection 5, 60, 9 89.9 23.4 0.84
Lowest false positive 15, 95, 5 65.2 10.6 0.74
Optimized
Highest F-measure 5, 85, 15 85.5 17.2 0.85
Best malware detection 10, 60, 7 89.9 24.7 0.83
Lowest false positive 20, 90, 5 59.5 10.7 0.70
Detection speed is strictly related to the parameters chosen for malicious ap-
plications detection: larger sliding windows and higher number of checks in-
troduce a longer delay in detecting malware. When the Optimized features set is
considered with the parameters that maximize F-measure, malicious applications
are identified, on the average, after about 85 execution records; which makes the
detection time of 2 minutes and 50 seconds.
The discussed results have been obtained by using previously unseen malware
samples. We believe that even better results, in terms of detection accuracy, could
be obtained if, along with execution traces of previously unseen applications,
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alternative execution traces of known applications were considered during test
and validation. While we decided not to do it, to be consistent with statistical
analysis consolidated practices, we believe that this condition would be closer
to the one found in reality, where just a small number of malware samples are
completely unknown to the detection mechanisms.
5.2.5 Optimization of Sampling Period of Monitoring Infrastruc-
ture and Power Consumption
In order to find a suitable trade-off between the detection accuracy, detection
time and power consumption, as introduced in Section 3.3.4, in addition to test-
ing our malicious applications detector with different sliding window algorithm
parameters, listed in Table 5.5, we also performed the analysis of its detection
performance using different sampling periods for the monitoring infrastructure:
2s, 4s, 6s, 8s, 12s, and 16s.
In order to understand the relation between the most suitable parameters of
our sliding window based detection mechanism and considered sampling peri-
ods, we first investigate how F-measure changes if we change sampling period
without changing (re-tuning) the parameters of the sliding window. This rela-
tion between F-measure and the sampling period depicted in Figure 5.6, shows
us that in order to keep F-measure high the selection of the sampling period has
to be accompanied with the selection of the suitable sliding window algorithm
parameters. This can be seen in cases of all considered sampling periods, but
is particularly noticeable in case of 2s sampling period (red line in Figure 5.6)
where once sampling period is increased, detection accuracy drops significantly.
In general, when unsuitable parameters are used for a certain sampling period,
detection performance, expressed by F-measure, degrades rapidly. At the same
time, if the parameters are correctly chosen, detection performance is not signif-
icantly affected by the increased sampling period.
Having in mind the important connection between the sampling period and
the selection of the most suitable parameters for sliding window mechanism in
order to achieve high F-measure, we have investigated what are the most suit-
able parameters for each of the observed sampling periods, by repeating the pro-
cedure for the malicious applications detection described in Sections 3.3.2 and
5.2.4. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5.9 where best detection
performance obtained with the test set when different sampling periods are con-
sidered. If we look at the changes of the most suitable sliding window parameters
and the sampling period, we can observe that with the increased sampling pe-
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Figure 5.6. F-measure obtained with different sampling periods and the sliding
window algorithm parameters that maximize F-measure.
riod, the parameters of the sliding window mechanism that the best detect pres-
ence of malware tend to decrease. In addition to the obtained F-measure and
detection time, in this evaluation we also include the measured battery power
consumption, that was collected in the way introduced in Section 4.5. Power
consumption is a parameter that is directly connected with the sampling period,
and that decreases when the sampling period increases, as it also can be observed
from the results obtained in Table 5.9. Our analysis showed that the parameters
of the sliding window mechanism, different window sizes, thresholds and differ-
ent number of checks, do not affect the consumed power in the current setup
of the experiments and that it changes significantly only in the relation to the
sampling period.
Table 5.9. Best results obtained in the algorithm parameters exploration when
different sampling periods are considered.
Sampling
period (s)
Window
size
Threshold No. of
checks
F-measure Detection
time (s)
Average
Power
(mW)
2 5 80 15 0.88 161.94 54
4 3 70 12 0.88 150.36 32
6 3 70 8 0.88 149.52 24
8 3 70 6 0.88 147.36 20
12 3 70 4 0.88 143.52 16
16 3 70 3 0.87 137.76 14
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In addition to the evaluation of the proposed malicious applications detection
on the test set, we evaluate its performance also on the validation set with the
unseen applications and in Table 5.10 we show the obtained results. The setting
of the sliding window parameters are the same as the ones enclosed in Table 5.9.
From the obtained results we can see that when suitable detection parameters
are chosen, the F-measure variation is much less than the one depicted in Figure
5.6. Even-more, the F-measure in this situation varies only slightly, from 0.85 up
to 0.83. Detection time, on the unseen applications, varies from 159.84s up to
172.12s.
Table 5.10. Validation with different sampling periods.
Sampling
period (s)
Window
size
Threshold No. of
checks
F-measure Detection
time (s)
Average
Power
(mW)
2 5 80 15 0.85 172.12 54
4 3 70 12 0.84 162.68 32
6 3 70 8 0.84 161.64 24
8 3 70 6 0.84 165.2 20
12 3 70 4 0.83 159.84 16
16 3 70 3 0.83 163.2 14
Further insights on the dependencies between F-measure, detection time and
power can be seen in Figure 5.7, where we show the results in terms of F-measure,
power, and detection time obtained when all the possible combinations of win-
dow length, number of checks, thresholds, and sampling periods are considered.
While in this graph we show all the possible combinations of parameters, even
the ones that we have defined as unacceptable with too low detection rate (i.e.,
below 70%) and/or too high false positive rate (i.e. greater than 30%) in Fig-
ure 5.8, instead, we outline only those configurations that produce acceptable
results. By acceptable results we consider only the ones that have detection rate
above 70% and false positive rate below 30%, since lower values than this would
not be practical for any real-time scenario. As it can be seen, in this case the num-
ber of acceptable solutions decreases when the sampling period is increased.
The dependencies among the three parameters – detection accuracy, detec-
tion time and power consumption – when the sliding window parameters and the
sampling period are changed, can be better seen in Figures 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11
where they are plotted in pairs, so that it is easier to understand their relation.
Figure 5.9 shows F-measure and power of all the configurations with accept-
able performance. It can be noticed that all power levels, associated with sam-
pling periods, have a configuration that reaches similar detection performance,
even though the lower the sampling period the higher the number of valid con-
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Figure 5.7. F-measure, power, and detection time obtained for all configura-
tions (sliding window algorithm parameters and sampling periods).
Figure 5.8. F-measure, power, and detection time obtained for configurations
(sliding window algorithm parameters and sampling periods) that have accept-
able performance.
figurations to chose from. Since bigger sampling periods, associated with lower
power levels, can provide similar detection performance as the ones provided by
smaller sampling periods, from this point of view higher sampling periods should
80 5.2 Malware Detection
be favoured.
Figure 5.9. F-measure vs. power for all the configurations that have acceptable
performance.
Figure 5.10 shows F-measure and detection time of all the configurations with
acceptable performance; it can be noticed that F-measure reaches its maximum
with detection times between 140 and 160 seconds. Detection times longer than
190 seconds are associated with solutions with the worse F-measure. From the
point of view of the detection time, in this case there is no generally preferred
selection, since the valid solutions are spread among all observed sampling peri-
ods.
Figure 5.11 shows the relationship between power and detection time of
all the configurations with acceptable performance. As previously noted, lower
power configurations are associated with higher sampling periods but have less
available configurations. We can notice how detection times belonging to the
configurations with the same power consumption tend to concentrate in groups
related to the parameters used. We can also conclude that if we prefer shorter
detection time, the lower sampling periods should be chosen. In fact, if the short-
est detection time has the priority in the applications domain, for the scenario
that we observed, the decision on the possible infection could be obtained after
47s.
As previously shown in Section 3.3.5, comparing different solutions can be
difficult when optimizing for multiple parameters, for which we introduced the
metric shown in Equation 3.1.
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Figure 5.10. F-measure vs. detection time for all the configurations that have
acceptable performance.
Figure 5.11. Power versus time for all the configurations that have acceptable
performance.
Figure 5.12 shows the values of the metric for all the valid configurations.
It can be noticed how values of the metric tend to increase by increasing the
sampling period from 2s to 16s: this is due to the decrease in power, since,
as previously discussed, detection time and F-measure are similar for solutions
using different sampling periods of the monitoring infrastructure. The configu-
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rations that maximize our metric are the ones with sampling periods 8, 12, and
16 s. In particular, the solutions that maximized the metric has a sampling pe-
riod of 8 s, with window size equal to 10, threshold equal to 90% and number of
checks equal to 1. With this solution, F-measure is equal to 0.85, detection time
is equal to 85.52 s and power is equal to 20mW; false positive and detection
rates are equal to 28% and 92%, respectively. The selected detection solution
is a result of the optimization between detection accuracy, detection time and
power consumption, when each of these requirements is taken into account as
equally important. In some application-specific scenarios such detection per-
formance might not be the most suitable. For example, the detection time of
85.52 s for some types of malware might be too long, or the detection rate of
92% could not be tolerated. By having designed malware detection system that
takes into account different requirements, we can further tune it by consider-
ing those application-specific requirements that are the most important in the
observed detection environment, such as best detection time, best F-measure,
lowest false positive, or highest detection rate. Although we do not investigate
in detail such extreme application-specific scenarios, in Table 5.11 we list the con-
figurations that satisfy such criteria and that could be used in scenarios when the
mentioned requirements have the highest significance. Even though we use the
metric that takes mentioned requirements as equally important, also other met-
rics that favour one parameter over the others (e.g., by using the square values
of the parameter itself) can be adopted with different results in terms of the se-
lected optimized configuration, but with the steps of the methodology performed
in a same way.
Table 5.11. Best configurations for the observed optimization criteria.
Optimized for Sampling
period
(s)
Window size
/ Threshold /
No. of checks
F-
measure
False pos-
itive /
Detection
rate
Detection
time (s)
Average
Power
(mW)
F-measure 12 3 / 70 / 4 0.88 21.45% /
94.73%
143.52 16
Detection time 2 20 / 95 / 1 0.86 28.36% /
95.39%
47.06 54
Lowest fp (detection >
30%)
4 50 / 95 / 1 0.79 8% /
70.39%
200 31
Highest detection
(fp<30%)
12 1 / 60 / 12 0.87 26.9% /
96.05%
138.84 16
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Figure 5.12. Metric values of all the configurations that have acceptable per-
formance.
5.3 Malware Classification
In this section we describe the results we obtained when the approach on discrim-
ination between diverse malware behavior introduced in Section 3.4 is applied
to features representing memory, CPU and network behavior. In order to eval-
uate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, the Android malware families
described in Section 4.1.4 are used. We selected all considered malware families
to be Trojans, because of the fact that the detection of Trojans is a particularly
difficult task, due to their similarity with legitimate, benign, applications. At the
same time, Trojans are one of the most present malware types in mobile devices,
so their detection is of high importance to the community and relevant for the
users.
The information about number and types of the applications used in the eval-
uation of the method are described in Section 4.1.4. Both malware and benign
samples have been executed in the Android SDK in a way introduced in Section
4.2. As a classification algorithm, apart from the previously described NB and LR
classifiers, we also used SVM, that is a supervised learning model that given a set
of training examples, each marked for belonging to one of two categories, builds
a model that assigns new examples into one category or the other. The SVM
implementation suggested by Platt [1999] and available in Weka was used; this
implementation includes sequential minimal optimization. The selected kernel
is the commonly used polynomial one, that allows learning of non-linear models.
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In the remaining of this section we discuss the selection of the indicative fea-
tures for different malware families, performed by CFS Subset Evaluator, and
the results obtained using these features and classifiers of low complexity in dis-
crimination between them, that show how memory, network and CPU contain
enough information to perform malware classification.
In this scenario all the collected features related to the memory, CPU, and
network behavior are used. In total, this makes 73 features. The goal of the
performed experiments was to observe if the difference in behavior between be-
nign and malicious trojanized execution records is reflected by their different
influence on memory, CPU and network behavior and if there are differences be-
tween Trojans belonging to different malware families. In order to investigate if
there are behavioural differences among different malware families, in the per-
formed experiments we marked as malware only the samples belonging to the
considered Trojan family and all the others as benign, and we evaluate the de-
tection performance of the used algorithms with respect to that. As in malware
detection scenario, we used ten fold cross-validation for validating the obtained
results.
Out of the selected sets of the most indicative features per family, we create a
superset that is formed by the union of the sets of features identified as the most
significant ones for each family. This superset is the one that is monitored and
stored on device and sent for remote analysis in case of malware detected. The
features in this superset are listed and described in Table 5.12, where they are
also described. The obtained results using these features and the classifiers of
interest are enclosed in Table 5.13.
The most informative features for the Droid Kung Fu family, as shown in
Table 5.12, are three; by considering these three features and the LR classifier,
according to Table 5.13, we are able to achieve a detection accuracy equal to
76.5% on detection of malicious records. Also in the case of the Fake Player
family, three features are selected as the most indicative ones and malware in
this family can be detected with the highest accuracy of 99.7% using LR, while,
at the same time, both NB and SVM show similarly good detection performance.
Also the Geinimi family can be detected accurately by using SVM or LR. The most
indicative features that have been selected are 13 (5 related to memory usage,
3 related to CPU consumption, and 8 related to network traffic). Considering
only these features we have achieved an accuracy equal to 97% by using SVM
classifier. Six features have been selected for the Ginger Master Trojan family.
By using these features, the highest obtained detection accuracy, using SVM, is
78.7%. For the Kmin Trojan family, eight memory-related, one CPU-related, and
two network-related features have been selected as the most significant ones,
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Table 5.12. Representative features of the observed malicious Trojan families
Trojan Family
Feature Name Description Droid
Kung
Fu
Fake
Player
Geinimi Ginger
Master
Kmin
.ttf mmap PSS Memory usage for true type fonts, including
pages shared with other processes
× × ×
Network load
over last minute
Network load in bits/second registered in the
last minute
× × ×
Maximum packet
size in bytes
Maximum network packets size in bytes ob-
served in the 2s sampling period
×
.dex mmap Pss Memory usage for Dalvik code, including pages
shared with other processes
×
Number of ARP
packets
Number of ARP network packets received and
transmitted in the 2s sampling period
×
.jar mmap Pss Memory usage for Java code, including pages
shared among processes
×
Other mmap Pss Memory usage for non-classified purposes, in-
cluding pages shared among processes
×
Other mmap
Shared Dirty
Memory shared among processes, in the Dirty
state, being used for non-classified purposes
×
Number of TCP
packets
Number of TCP network packets received and
transmitted in the 2s sampling period
×
Unknown Pss Memory usage for unknown purposes, including
pages shared among processes
×
TOTAL Heap Size Total heap size allocated for the process × ×
CPU User User-space CPU usage of the process ×
CPU kernel Kernel-space CPU usage of the process ×
minor faults Virtual memory minor page faults caused by the
process
× × ×
bps Network load in bits/second registered in the 2s
sampling period
× × ×
Number of ICMP
packets
Number of ICMP network packets received and
transmitted in the 2s sampling period
×
Size in byte stan-
dard deviation
Standard deviation of the network packet size in
bytes in the 2s sampling period
×
Number of bytes Number of bytes transmitted and received in the
2s sampling period
×
.so mmap Private
Dirty
Private memory of the process, in the Dirty state,
being used for mapped native code
× ×
Number of UDP
packets
Number of UDP network packets received and
transmitted in the 2s sampling period
× ×
Ashmem Private
Dirty
Private memory of the process, in the Dirty state,
being allocated as Android shared memory
×
.so mmap Pss Memory usage for mapped native code, includ-
ing pages shared with other processes
×
.so mmap Shared
Dirty
Memory shared with other processes, in the
Dirty state, being used for mapped native code
×
.apk mmap Pss Memory usage for Android application package
files, including pages shared with other pro-
cesses
×
TOTAL Shared
Dirty
Total memory of the process that is shared and
it is marked as dirty
×
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Table 5.13. Obtained malware classification results
Droid Kung Fu Fake Player Geinimi GinMaster Kmin
NB 58% 99.7% 90% 77.2% 81.5%
LR 76.5% 99.8% 96.8% 78.4% 95.3%
SVM 74.2% 99.7% 97% 78.7% 95.4%
and using them the highest detection accuracy of 95.4% is achieved by again
using SVM classifier.
From the performed experiments and by comparing the selected features per
each malware family, we can observe that different behaviors of different mali-
cious Trojan families are reflected by different usage patterns of memory, CPU,
and network. The behavior of some families (Kmin) is better reflected in mem-
ory related features; the behavior of some other families (Droid Kung Fu, Fake
Player) is, instead, better reflected through network-related features; for some
other families (Geinimi), features from all categories are important for detection.
The differences are significant enough to allow us to identify these families with
good accuracy. We validated this observation by using three different classifiers
and showed that high detection accuracy can be achieved using only a reduced
set of features. From Table 5.12 we can see that some malware families have
common representative features. This means that if we use a dedicated classi-
fier for identification of each family, it could happen that more than one of them
identifies running malware as belonging to that particular family. In real-time
usage such problem would be resolved by taking as an output of the classifica-
tion the result from a classifiers for which, based on the offline analysis, we know
that the confidence in detection of the observed malware family is the highest.
5.4 Performance Evaluation of a Hybrid Method
In this section, we report the results obtained when considering static detection
alone, dynamic detection alone, and the hybrid method that combines these two
as described in Section 3.5. For the evaluation of this approach we have used a
dataset consisting of malicious applications and benign applications described in
Section 4.1.5.
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5.4.1 Static Detection Results
We first discuss the obtained results when only static detection method described
in Section 3.5.1 is used. As mentioned in Section 3.5.1 we have experimented
with three different classifiers, namely J48, Naive Bayes (NB), and Logistic Re-
gression (LR) as well as with n equal to 2. We have used h = 50 as parameter
for feature selection. After the learning phase, performed by using the train-
ing set described in Section 4.1.5, we applied the obtained classifier, C , to each
application of the test set and we measured precision, recall, and F-Measure.
Obtained results are shown in Table 5.14. With the three different classifi-
cation algorithms considered in the study, we have obtained a precision rang-
ing from 0.968 to 0.998, a recall ranging between 0.988 and 0.997, and the
F-Measure between 0.980 and 0.998. The classifier with best performance was
J48.
Table 5.14. Classification results for malicious and benign applications when
features extracted by static analysis are considered along with the J48, NB and
LR classifiers.
Algorithm Precision Recall F-Measure
Malware Benign Malware Benign Malware Benign
J48 0.998 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.998 1.000
NB 0.968 1.000 0.992 0.998 0.980 0.999
LR 0.994 0.999 0.988 1.000 0.991 0.999
The static method classifies correctly all the benign applications (i.e., no be-
nign application is marked as malware), but nine malicious applications are mis-
classified as benign. In other words, the static method has no false positive, but
it has nine false negatives. False negatives are represented by three malware
samples from the Simple Locker family and six samples from Koler family; all
the samples from the other families (i.e., Locker, Svpeng, and ScarePackage) are
classified correctly as malware.
5.4.2 Dynamic Detection
As described in Section 3.5.2, we applied our dynamic detection method in this
scenario, where we considered dynamic features related to memory, CPU usage
and features derived from network usage and statistics on system calls. In Table
5.15 we enclose the classification results obtained by using the algorithms for
the detection of malicious records, the first stage of our malicious applications
detection system. While NB provides lower detection accuracy, both LR and J48
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perform well as shown by all considered metrics. Although both of these methods
are of low complexity and suitable for on-device detection, due to its ability to
assign a probability of being malicious to a record, instead of just providing a
binary decision, we opted for the Logistic Regression classifier as a detector of
malicious records also in this scenario.
Table 5.15. Classification results for malware and benign applications when
features extracted by dynamic analysis are considered along with the J48, NB
and LR classifiers.
Algorithm Precision Recall F-Measure
Malware Benign Malware Benign Malware Benign
J48 0.988 0.994 0.976 0.997 0.982 0.995
NB 0.382 0.975 0.940 0.605 0.543 0.747
LR 0.933 0.973 0.894 0.983 0.913 0.978
After the classification of the malicious records is done, we use the sliding
window technique to investigate if complete applications are malicious or be-
nign. In order to find the most suitable parameters for this scenario, we again
run a batch of experiments by considering the initial combinations of parameters
depicted in the leftmost part of the Table 5.5 on the training set. Based on these
parameters, we have selected the configurations that provide highest F-measure,
highest detection accuracy with false positive below 20%, lowest false positive
with accuracy higher than 80%, and lowest detection time. The best configura-
tions according to the aforementioned metrics are shown, along with the corre-
sponding detection performance, in Table 5.16. In these results, detection time
is measured from the first execution record marked as malicious. We have per-
formed a fine-grain exploration in the surroundings of the optimal parameters
identified during the coarse-grain exploration. The combinations of parameters
considered in this phase are shown in rightmost side of the Table 5.5. The results
of this exploration, which lead to the optimal parameters of our dynamic detec-
tion system, are shown in Table 5.17; as previously mentioned, the parameters
can be chosen to optimize different metrics and this is reflected in the table. The
best trade-off between these requirements is represented by highest F-measure
that in our case is 0.85. This configuration provides high accuracy, with a low
number of false positive and a short detection time.
Based on these obtained results, we have selected the configurations that
provide highest F-measure, highest detection accuracy with false positive below
20%, lowest false positive with accuracy higher than 80%, and lowest detection
time. These configurations are considered having in mind different possible ap-
plication scenarios (those in which detection accuracy would have the highest
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priority, those where the lowest false positives would have the highest priority,
and those in which balance of both of them would be preferred).
Table 5.16. Best results obtained in coarse-grain exploration.
Configuration Window
length
Threshold
(%)
Checks Detection
rate (%)
False pos-
itive rate
(%)
F-
measure
Detection
time (s)
Highest F-measure 10 70 1 91.28 3.78 0.84 21.24
Highest detection rate /
lowest detection time
5 60 1 93.57 5.33 0.81 9.28
Lowest false positive 10 70 1 91.28 3.78 0.84 21.24
Table 5.17. Best results obtained with respect to the observed metrics.
Configuration Window
length
Threshold
(%)
Checks Detection
rate (%)
False pos-
itive rate
(%)
F-
measure
Detection
time (s)
Highest F-measure 9 78 1 90.82 3.46 0.85 20.46
Highest detection rate /
lowest detection time
1 60 1 96.33 19.84 0.58 0
Lowest false positive 10 70 2 80.27 2.92 0.80 60.84
After selecting the optimal parameters on the training set, we tested them
on the test set. In Table 5.18 we show the obtained results. As expected, detec-
tion performance decreases with respect to the training set, but it still remains
high; for example, when the parameters for highest F-measure are selected, the
detection rate decreases from 90% to 85%. The case of the parameters cho-
sen for the lowest false positive rate provides best performance on the test set,
with an increase of the detection rate and a slight increase of the false positive
rate. We can observe that results outlined in Table 5.8 in the scenario in which
we were using the balanced dataset introduced in Section 4.1.3 are in line with
the results obtained in this, hybrid scenario, where we are using an unbalanced
dataset introduced in Section 4.1.5.
Table 5.18. Results obtained in the testing phase with the best parameters
obtained in the exploration phase. Detection time is measured from the first
record identified as malicious.
Configuration Window
length
Threshold
(%)
Checks Detection
rate (%)
False pos-
itive rate
(%)
F-
measure
Detection
time (s)
Highest F-measure 9 78 1 85.61 5.31 0.88 24.24
Highest detection rate /
lowest detection time
1 60 1 93.03 25.06 0.79 0
Lowest false positive 10 70 2 84.68 3.81 0.89 44.72
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When best F-measure parameters are considered, undetected malware in the
test set is equal to 62. By relying on the Virus Total [n.d.] analyses, we have clas-
sified these samples in categories; we have taken as a reference F-secure since
it provides descriptive malware definitions. Most of the malicious samples that
are not identified by our dynamic malware detection method belong to the Sim-
plelocker (61%) and to the Koler (19%) families. The remaining samples were
not identified as malicious by F-Secure. Similarly to static detection and although
providing promising results on unseen malicious samples, our dynamic detection
alone was not able to detect all the observed malicious samples.
5.4.3 Hybrid Detection
To evaluate the effectiveness of the hybrid approach, we have considered the list
of malicious applications in the test set that are not detected by the used static
method, and we have checked whether our dynamic detector could correctly de-
tect them as malware. In fact, all the nine applications that are not detected
by the used static method are correctly identified as malware by our dynamic
method, with all the three sets of optimal parameters. Therefore, we have ver-
ified our initial assumption that by using a hybrid method we could increase
the coverage of malware detection. In fact, starting from a detection rate of
99.8% for static detection and of 85.61% (with best F-measure parameters) for
dynamic detection, we obtain a 100% detection rate for hybrid detection. While
the static method has no false positives, the dynamic method has some, as shown
in Table 5.18. Considering the extremely good detection performance, we can
choose to optimize the dynamic method for the lowest number of false positives,
which when the corresponding parameters from Table 5.18 are chosen, makes
the false positive rate of 3.81%. In summary, the results show that using the hy-
brid method is the way to follow in order to provide effective protection against
malware not only for its increased coverage, but also to unite the accuracy of
static detection with the possibility of detecting malware at runtime.
5.5 Limitations of the Proposed Approach
Our detection system uses dynamic features that are by their nature more difficult
to evade than the static ones. The assumption for usage of dynamic features
is that even when the applications are repackaged or obfuscated, during their
execution they will still have similar behavioral footprints, and a classifier trained
on these features could properly discriminate malicious applications from benign
91 5.5 Limitations of the Proposed Approach
ones. Our detection method can detect effectively known malicious samples and
unknown malicious samples belonging to known malware families. However, it
cannot guarantee, as any other detection method, absolute security. If an attacker
develops a new malicious sample that has a behavior reflected in significantly
different feature profiles than the ones observed in our dataset, the detection
system might not be able to detect it.
Our approach is data driven and, as other methods that use a similar ap-
proach, such as the one proposed by Shabtai et al. [2012] and by Ham and Choi
[2013], it does not provide any help in understanding how the selected features
and their relations are connected with the behavior of the applications. There-
fore, while selected features can be described individually and the rationale be-
yond algorithms can be explained, an explanation on why features are important
for the identification of malware is possible only in the simplest cases, where the
number of available features is very limited and the system is extremely simple.
However, without usage of these algorithms and models it would be impossible
to measure usefulness of features, identify their correlations, and choose only
the most indicative ones.
Additionally, our approach, being based on dynamic detection, inherits the
same weakness of other dynamic detection methods when it comes to malicious
payload triggering. Namely, in our experiments we were executing malicious
applications with Monkey runner tool, and, in order to trigger and record their
malicious intents and to stimulate the malicious payload we used a set of activa-
tion events proposed by Zhou and Jiang [2012]. However, we cannot guarantee
that the malicious execution path is actually triggered within the observed execu-
tion time. This is a common problem of dynamic detection methods where many
possible execution paths exist and it is challenging to guarantee that exactly the
one with malicious intents is triggered.
In comparison to static analysis, our method shows lower detection accuracy,
and the hybrid method outperforms both individual approaches. However, we
need to point out that static and dynamic detection are different in what they
offer. In fact, static detection is able to detect malware before the application
containing it is executed, thereby preventing the malicious payload from execut-
ing and, thus, preventing any harm for the system. Dynamic detection, instead,
detects malware while applications are being executed and, thus, when some
harm to the system might already been caused. As previously discussed, our de-
tection method is relatively fast in detecting malicious behavior, but still it leaves
open the possibility of harming the system. On the other hand, dynamic de-
tection is able to capture malware at runtime, thus offering protection against
dynamically installed code, which cannot be detected by static methods since it
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is run with much lower periodicity, and also protection against malicious actions
hidden in the obfuscated or encrypted code.
5.6 Comparison of the Obtained Results with State-of-
the-art Methods
The main differences between our work and the other approaches on mobile
malware detection on devices, are:
• In Section 3.1 and in Milosevic, Malek and Ferrante [2017], we propose a
methodology for malware detection and malware classification, aimed to
be used on devices with limited computational capabilities.
• In Section 3.3 and in Milosevic et al. [2014] we presented a malware de-
tection architecture aimed to be used at runtime on mobile devices, that
not only considers detection accuracy, but also detection time, and power
consumption as main requirements.
• We created and used a dataset consisting of dynamic features related to
memory, CPU, network behavior and system calls, that, to the best of our
knowledge, was not considered up to date.
• In Milosevic, Malek and Ferrante [2016] and in Section 5.2.2, by means
of feature selection methods, we reduced the set of features from 53 to 7,
without affecting detection performance. Although the detection accuracy
is slightly lower than in the approaches presented by Canfora, Medvet,
Mercaldo and Visaggio [2015], by Ham and Choi [2013], and by Dini et al.
[2012], the number of features considered in our approach is much smaller,
which results in lower computational overhead and reduces the size of the
monitoring infrastructure
• Our malicious applications detection method presented in Milosevic, Fer-
rante and Malek [2016a] uses linear Logistic Regression and a simple slid-
ing window technique with a lower complexity than the approaches pro-
posed by Ham and Choi [2013], by Dini et al. [2012], and by Canfora,
Medvet, Mercaldo and Visaggio [2015]
• Our detection system outperforms, in terms of detection accuracy, four rep-
resentative mobile anti-virus software on Malware Genome dataset. The
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detection results of the mentioned anti-virus software that are obtained by
Zhou and Jiang [2012] are enclosed in Section 2.2.1
• In Milosevic, Ferrante and Malek [2016b] and in Section 5.3 we identi-
fied features to be monitored for classification of different malicious Tro-
jan families, based on which, using ensemble of detection algorithms of low
complexity, we could discriminate execution records belonging to different
families. While the approaches presented in state-of-the are effective in
identifying malware, to the best of our knowledge, no dynamic approach
exists that is able to perform such discrimination with such a small number
of features
• As opposed to currently existing methods, that focus on the identification
of complete mobile applications as malicious or benign, the method we
proposed in Ferrante et al. [2016] and in Section 3.3.3 can be used also to
detect malicious parts of applications executions
• In Milosevic, J. and Ferrante, A. and Malek, M. [2017] and in Section 5.2.5
we investigate the correlations between detection time and detection accu-
racy, detection accuracy and power consumption as well as between power
consumption and detection time, when the system parameters of our ma-
licious applications detection system are changed, and we investigate the
importance of changing the sampling period with respect to these param-
eters. To the best of our knowledge, such comprehensive evaluation of
dependencies between detection time, detection accuracy and power con-
sumption is not performed up to date
• Most of the existing malware detection methods is either focused on only
static or only dynamic analysis, and only few approaches consider hybrid
detection. In Ferrante et al. [2017] and in Section 5.4 we evaluate the de-
tection performance of a hybrid method that combines static and dynamic
approach, that is, to the best of our knowledge, the first work with the aim
to automatically identify real-world Android malware by using a hybrid
approach in order to assure a very high detection ratio.
Also, several results and their extensions have been published in several pa-
pers such as: Milosevic et al. [2014]; Milosevic, Ferrante and Regazzoni [2015];
Milosevic, Ferrante and Malek [2016c]; Milosevic, Malek and Ferrante [2016];
Milosevic, Ferrante and Malek [2016a,b]; Ferrante et al. [2016]; Milosevic, Malek
and Ferrante [2017]; Ferrante et al. [2017] and in our internal report Milosevic,
J. and Ferrante, A. and Malek, M. [2017].
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
Widespread adoption of smart, mobile devices helps their users in many different
domains and brings to them enormous possibilities previously unseen in human
era. Some of many domains in which users already profit from these devices are
smart homes, smart cities, smart grids, health-care and assistive technologies.
However, while more and more of the critical tasks are offloaded to machines and
intelligent systems, we have to make sure that their smartness is accompanied
with their secure design and that they are, in addition to providing envisioned
service, also able to protect users against unwanted malicious threats or at least
effectively detect them when/if they happen. However, due to the constantly
increasing complexity of the connected systems and a variety of possible attack
scenarios, this is a challenging task, that is further complicated by the fact that
the devices are battery-operated and with limited computational resources.
In order to further facilitate the adoption of smart mobile devices and enable
their secure usage, we focused on design, development and validation of the
effective and efficient runtime malware detection system. We aimed at detec-
tion method suitable for the resource-constrained environment and able to early
detect potential malicious infections, and due to this, we proposed a detection
system that takes into account in addition to detection accuracy, also detection
time and power consumption. By using these three figures of merit we evalu-
ated a set of different detection system parameters, and we identified those that
provide the optimized solution with respect to the observed metric. Our results
show that, if we design detection systems while from the early beginning having
in mind not only detection accuracy, but also detection time and power consump-
tion, we can provide effective detection solution that is at the same time efficient
enough to fit the limited resources of mobile devices. In the rest of this chap-
ter we first summarize the obtained results and then we outline the envisioned
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future steps.
6.1 Conclusions
The main goal of our work was to provide effective malware detection solu-
tions suitable to be used at runtime on resource-constrained devices. In order to
achieve this goal we observe the influence of malicious and benign applications
on dynamic system parameters and based on this influence we learn our detec-
tion systems to discriminate malware from benign execution records, malicious
from benign groups of execution records and malicious from benign applications.
The detection systems we trained also learned to discriminate between different
types of malware based on the way malicious applications belonging to diverse
malware families interact with the observed dynamic parameters, namely based
on their behavioural patterns. Finally, our developed system is able to do this
while at the same time taking into account the resource constrained environ-
ment of mobile devices, particularly constrained power, and also while having
early detection time as one of its priorities.
Our results show that, by observing only a limited number of features related
to memory and CPU (seven in case of NB and Logistic Regression, and six in case
of J48 Decision Tree), the execution records belonging to malicious applications
can be identified with precision and recall of more than 85%. Additionally, on
the average, a previously unseen malware application can be detected within
the first 2 minutes and 45 seconds of execution and the discrimination between
previously unseen malicious and benign applications can be performed with an
F-measure of 0.85 and with sampling period of two seconds. This can be achieved
with a sliding window technique that we proposed and that has linear complex-
ity, and that is suitable for on device usage. According to our results, one of the
most important aspects to be considered in such a design, that is currently miss-
ing in the state of the art, is the selection of the most suitable sampling period. If
sampling period of the monitoring infrastructure is increased and with respect to
it we retrain our detection systems, we can still obtain a satisfying detection per-
formance, while decreasing the consumed power. Namely, the sampling period
that shows the best performance for the considered scenario is of eight seconds,
with which the F-measure of 0.85 is obtained, detection time is 85.52s, power
is 20mW, and with false positive of 28% and detection rate of 92%. The accu-
racy of detection of malicious sub-traces with our proposed method is 0.67. This
method takes into account, apart from memory and CPU information, also system
calls that can be collected at runtime. Using behavioral patterns we proposed,
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we demonstrated that we can discriminate between different types of execution
records belonging to diverse malware families with accuracy of up to 99.8%.
These behavioral patterns capture discriminative influence of different malware
families on dynamic features related to memory, CPU and network behavior, and
can be identified with high accuracy using a small set of representative features.
The aforementioned results show the detection performance of our approach in
a scenario where all applications are being analyzed only dynamically by using
the approach we propose. However, when we evaluated our detection method in
a hybrid scenario, where the applications are first pre-screened for the presence
of malware offline using static analysis, and then analyzed at runtime by our
method, the detection accuracy that we obtained was of 100% and the false pos-
itives rate was 3.81%, showing that the combination of two approaches (static
and dynamic) is the best way to protect the devices against malware.
6.2 Future Work
Increasing number of battery-operated mobile devices and their increasing ap-
plications in all aspects of humans life, rise the need for their secure operation
and importance for their protection against malicious threats. Due to this, we
envision that in the future the relevance of the malware detection for resource-
constrained devices will continue to increase and we intend to continue working
in this area where effective solutions are still needed in order to provide help and
protection against malware to billions of users and to empower them to take the
advantage of smart connected devices in the best possible way. Following, we
describe the main research questions that we aim to tackle:
6.2.1 Are static or dynamic features more resistant against unseen
malware families?
When it comes to the detection of malware, dynamic detection is more resistant
against unknown samples since it looks at their behavior at runtime that is not
as easy to obfuscate as their source code, which is usually what is analyzed by
static methods. However, if the malware is coming from a completely new mal-
ware family, previously unseen in the training stage, it is not clear what would be
the detection performance of dynamic methods and which one would perform
better, static or dynamic method. One of our envisioned future works is to in-
vestigate this. In order to achieve this goal, we aim at performing the analysis
in which training would be done using a set of families released up to certain
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time and testing would be done with a set of families released after the consid-
ered time (i.e., training with families released up to year 2015 and testing with
families released after), and then on such a dataset we would evaluate the detec-
tion performance of both static and dynamic analysis and compare the obtained
results.
6.2.2 Is deep learning a good candidate for malware classification
task, and if yes, can we have timely decisions using it?
In our currently proposed architecture, the features indicative for the presence of
the investigated malware families are stored at runtime, and, when the presence
of malware is indicated, they are sent into a network for the further analysis
of the type of malware that is being detected on the phone. In this domain,
we identified a set of the most representative features for the observed families,
and verified their importance in the discrimination of malware by performing the
analysis described in Section 5.3. However, this detection is still at the level of the
execution records. The next challenge that we want to address is the extension
of this module to the application level. In the envisioned scenario, the classifica-
tion will take place at the cloud infrastructure, and for each of the families that
we observe in the analysis, we envision to include comprehensive set of counter-
measures to be taken, if its identified with high confidence. Since the analysis in
this case would happen in a non resource-constrained environment, we aim at
use of different sophisticated algorithms to further increase the accuracy of de-
tection, with higher complexity than currently used ones, that are used for the on
device detection. As one of the potential candidates for such analysis we foresee
a classifier based on deep learning, since deep learning have outperformed, in
terms of detection accuracy, many other state-of-the-art machine learning based
methods and since it was already successfully used in different domains where
high detection accuracy matters. However, in addition to the high complexity of
deep learning based methods, that makes them suitable only for the off-device
analysis, the main question and the main challenge is to evaluate if the inference
time is short enough to make their classification outcome useful and applicable in
the practical scenario. The investigation of this research problem and the answer
to this question is one of our envisioned future steps.
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6.2.3 Would we benefit from a dedicated hardware accelerators for
on-device malware detection?
Sending information into cloud infrastructure for further analysis is one way to
follow in order to avoid running complex, power and memory consuming, algo-
rithms on a device, that are already constrained in terms of these resources. The
additional way to cope with this problem is through design and development
of dedicated hardware accelerators, that would be used to perform the most
computationally complex part of the calculations on the device. However, while
different software solutions are proposed in the state of the art, the same trend
is not followed in the hardware design domain. Bridging this gap and design-
ing a hardware accelerator for the further increase in the efficiency of malware
detection is also one of the our envisioned future steps.
6.2.4 What are the performance of our detection methods if ap-
plied in the other elements of the IoT infrastructure?
The methodology we propose takes into account the constrained environment of
mobile devices by minimizing the number of monitored features, by adopting al-
gorithms of low complexity, and by using the sampling period that is the trade-off
between detection performance, detection time and consumed power. We eval-
uated the performance of the proposed methodology by using malware samples
for Android OS and Nexus 5, a mobile device with reasonable computing power.
However, we believe that this methodology can be successfully applied also on
other IoT devices, that are even more constrained in terms of available resources
and it is one of our envisioned future steps to investigate this hypothesis.
6.2.5 Using this methodology can we detect cyber attacks in smart
grid?
While electrical grid becomes smart, it is at the same time becoming exposed to
different cyber attacks and thus more vulnerable. On the other side, since smart
grid is a relatively new concept, there are not that many solutions for the effec-
tive protection against attacks in them. One of the envisioned future steps is the
application of the proposed methodology in the domain of the smart grid and
the evaluation of the detection performance in that environment.
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In the future everything smart and connected world there will be many problems,
certainly some related to security. However, if we design our systems with se-
curity in mind and we adopt detection time and power consumption from early
design as equally important factors as the detection accuracy, then we can al-
ready now mitigate some of those possible problems and deliver smart, secure
and connected systems.
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